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West Europe Report



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8 November 1985

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

COMMUNIST PARTY MEETING CONCENTRATES ON DOMESTIC ISSUES

Chairman's Leadership Capability

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Oct 85 p 6

[Commentary by Kim Barren: "Party Leader Without Impact"]

[Text] A capable organizer and a person who is working hard for the party--but a person without any impact on the public.

The above character sketch applies to the chairman of the Communist Party of Denmark, Jørgen Jensen, who, during the weekend, will be heading the national congress of the Communist Party, to be held at Odense.

When, 65 years ago, Jørgen Jensen was born into a family which he himself has referred to as a "good, Social Democratic family," his father being a bricklayer, no one ever dreamt that he would some day become chairman of the Communist Party of Denmark. Nor did he exert any pressure to take over the chairmanship when Knud Jespersen died. On two earlier occasions he had declined the offer, but being a loyal party soldier, he accepted the post when asked in 1977.

Impossible Task

Succeeding Knud Jespersen was an almost impossible task. Jørgen Jensen is a hard worker but is deemed colorless by the public. In addition, he took over at a time when the Communist Party had begun losing ground--especially to the Socialist People's Party.

Jørgen Jensen is a trained auto mechanic and became a shop representative for the first time at the age of 20, which, among other things, led to his appointment as chairman of the division of the Danish Metal Workers' Union in Lyngby, and, later on, he became a member of the executive committee of the Danish Metal Workers' Union. Five years later, he joined the Communist Party of Denmark and was in 1962 elected a member of the party's central committee, of which he has been a member ever since. At the same time, he was nominated for the Folketing, but he did not become a member of the Folketing until 1975. At Christiansborg [parliament], he was also respected by political opponents for his diligence and knowledge--especially on labor market issues.

Jørgen Jensen, however, was unable to prevent the Communist Party from getting out of the Folketing in 1979. Since then the party has been struggling for a comeback, but without success. In the most recent election in 1984, the party got only 0.7 percent of the vote. It is anybody's guess when Jørgen Jensen will retire from his chairmanship in the Communist Party, but he might very well do so at the congress of the party next year. His replacement? Several names come to mind. But three good possibilities are the chairman of the Semi-Skilled Workers' Union at Horsens, Ole Sohn, the chairman of the Metal Workers' Union Division 13 in Copenhagen, Jan Andersen, or one of the major figures within the Anti-EC Movement, Jens-Peter Bonde.

'Assistance' to Afghanistan Praised

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Oct 85 p 14

[Article by RB]

[Text] At the national congress of the party at Odense, Jørgen Jensen, chairman of the Communist Party, opposed profit sharing and economic democracy, tripartite negotiations, the incomes policy and the labor legislation.

"Capitalism, the attitudes of nonsocialists and the forces of the Right are the chief enemies," Jørgen Jensen, chairman of the Communist Party, stated in his concluding remarks at the debate Sunday afternoon of the national congress of the Communist Party, held at Odense.

"Severe attacks have been launched against the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Socialist-Left Party at the national congress, but has that weakened our unity? I do not believe so. Unity has to develop from below and grow strong in the struggle, so that people are forced to choose sides. We are not to criticize so that the unity against the Right is checked or rendered difficult but so that it is aimed at its target and will eliminate the nonsocialist attitudes which have penetrated into the working class," said Jørgen Jensen.

He dissociated himself from profit sharing and economic democracy because, in the opinion of the Communist Party, they weaken the goals of the working class. Jørgen Jensen also opposed the tripartite negotiations, the incomes policy, the labor legislation and the employer's right to supervise and distribute work.

The chairman of the Communist Party opposed the tax agreement, which, as far as he can see it, means that the Social Democratic Party accepts the economic policy and the incomes policy pursued by the nonsocialist government. He found that the intervention by the government in the spring ignored the labor law system, according to which the working class is entitled to make collective wage demands and strike for them.

Soviet Aid to Afghanistan

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan he described as "Soviet aid to Afghanistan."

"As long as it is possible to make people interpret Soviet aid to Afghanistan as aggression, this will weaken the possibilities of developing the struggle against the forces of war. Peace is indivisible, and we cannot feel safe in our peace as long as people are being murdered and oppressed by military means on the part of imperialists, and as long as there are people who are prevented from altering their social conditions."

The national congress, which is the advisory body of the central committee of the Communist Party, went off well without a hitch, and Jørgen Jensen established that the debate and the four draft resolutions would not occasion any meeting of the central committee. The Communist Party will hold its party congress in 1986.

A participant in the meeting from Portugal, Luis Monteiro, who immigrated to Denmark about 10 years ago, was applauded enthusiastically when he urged nipping the insipient racism in the bud. He advocated granting the right to vote and the right to offer oneself as a candidate for the Folketing to immigrants as well as full integration into the Danish society.

Economic, Environment Program

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Oct 85 p 14

[Article by RB]

[Text] The Communists warn against eliminating block grants, demand a referendum on the position of the Danes on an EC union and demand that the society take over Danish Underground Consortium.

"The municipal election to be held on Tuesday, 19 November 1985, will have to be a showdown with the antisocial class policy pursued by the nonsocialist Schluter government," it says in one of the four resolutions adopted over the weekend by the national congress of the Communist Party in Odense.

In its first resolution, the party warns against an elimination of the block grants, which, in the opinion of the party, will force the municipalities to abandon necessary tasks and prepare the way for a transfer to the private sector. Efforts for increased employment involve production by the public sector, and large-scale housing construction will have to be started, it says in the resolution.

The Communist Party, moreover, wants to improve the municipal services.

The environmental problems will have to be solved by way of far more efficient measures of control on the part of the counties and municipalities.

In conjunction with the municipal elections, the Communist Party wants a referendum on Denmark's position on an EC union. The second referendum points to the basis for Denmark's entry into the EC in 1972, when we were assured that there would be no joint foreign and defense policy, and that our right to reject EC demands would not be infringed. The Communist Party finds that the government ought to have refused to participate in the negotiations concerning an EC union.

In its third resolution, the Communist Party demands the takeover by the society of Danish Underground Consortium. It is claimed that the conditions in connection with the oil and gas production in the North Sea have developed into a 'scandal.' Instead of receiving 1.5 billion kroner by way of the hydrocarbon tax, the state has received 6 million kroner only. The resolution proposes that a fact-finding committee be set up to carry through a thorough examination of the activities in the North Sea on the part of DUC [Danish Underground Consortium].

Finally, in its fourth resolution, the Communist Party demands a nuclear-free zone comprising the Nordic Countries and a discontinuation of Danish participation in "provocative maneuvers in the Baltic with NATO ships and aircraft carrying nuclear arms."

It is claimed that certain Soviet proposals banning star war weapons and 50 percent cuts in strategic nuclear arms open up the possibility of a decisive change in the international situation, provided the United States is ready.

7262

CSO: 3613/9

POLITICAL

FINLAND

SOVIET STAND ON COMMUNIST PARTY FEUD AIRED

Moderates' Publisher Cuts Jobs

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Oct 85 p 10

[Article: "Yhteistyö Printing Plant Dismisses 86 Persons; Finnish Communist Party Majority Loses 'SPUTNIK' to Minority"]

[Text] Losing the job of printing the Soviet periodical SPUTNIK has led to the dismissal of 86 workers at the printing plant Yhteistyö [Cooperation], which is owned by the majority communists. The Soviet customer transferred the printing job worth 25 million to Kursiivi [Italics], the printing plant of the Taisto Sinisalo communists.

The work force at Yhteistyö, Inc, is reduced by 98 persons altogether when--in addition to those dismissed--those who retired and those who resigned voluntarily are taken into account. For the time being, 104 workers and officers remain at the printing plant.

The printing plant's work load is curtailed by the changeover of KANSAN UUTiset, main organ of the Finnish Communist Party (FCP) and the Finnish People's Democratic League, to a 5-day-a-week newspaper as well as by the loss of SPUTNIK. Elimination of one weekly issue caused a cutback of 16 workers at the newspaper printing plant.

As late as Tuesday, the workers asked that the dismissals be postponed. The leadership at Yhteistyö, Inc, announced, however, that the dismissals must go into effect immediately.

The printers do not accept the large number of dismissals. What the dismissed workers want this very day from the Yhteistyö board of directors is a further clarification of the company's economic situation and of the future outlook for orders.

If the clarification is unsatisfactory, the printers will take the matter to court and subject it to interunion negotiations. The grounds for the dismissals--reasons of production and economy--are not disputed by the workers.

Circulation of Half Million

The periodical SPUTNIK, "the Soviet Union's READER'S DIGEST," is published in Finnish under the title MAAILMA JA ME [We and the World]. Its invoice has fetched

nearly half the business volume of the Yhteistyö printing plant. SPUTNIK is printed monthly, and its circulation is over half a million. The periodical is printed in Finland in five languages.

Transfer of the SPUTNIK money from the printing plant of the Finnish Communist Party majority to the printing plant of the minority is linked to the FCP's ongoing breakup. The FCP leadership is expected to expel the Sinisalo districts next weekend, something which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has condemned in unmistakable terms. Through the transfer of printing work, the fraternal Soviet party again shows that it supports the minority led by Taisto Sinisalo.

Kursiivi, the printing plant of the Sinisalo communists, is unable in practice to print SPUTNIK but will engage a subcontractor, Sanomaprint [Newsprint], to do the printing. The Soviet payments will go through Kursiivi, however, so that the latter receives its own commission for the printing.

Registry of Associations Approves FCP's New Rules

The registry of associations has approved the Communist Party's new rules, which give the Central Committee the right to expel district organizations from the party. According to the interpretation of the FCP majority leadership, the rule changes sanctioned by the extraordinary party congress have thus acquired legal force, and there is no obstacle to their application.

The Central Committee will discuss expulsion of the minority's eight district organizations at a meeting to be held next Sunday at the Culture House in Helsinki.

The Sinisalo minority has clung to its belief that the rule change is contestable. The complaint concerning the rule change is on the Helsinki Municipal Court docket for December.

The proposal to expel the eight district organizations will be made to the Central Committee by the FCP Politburo, which convenes on Wednesday and, if necessary, even a second time before the Central Committee's meeting.

Gorbachev Government Influence Pondered

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Arvo Aalto's Bipartition"]

[Text] The Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party had given the eight minority districts until Monday to answer charges of independent activity and to return to the fold. In its sharply worded reply the minority has, as expected, cuttingly rejected the ultimatum and demanded new negotiations for bringing about party unity.

In the minority districts' reply Chairman "Arvo Aalto and his leadership group" are accused, among other things, of abandoning internationalism, breaking up the party, and replacing Marxism-Leninism with a "muddled pluralism." Yet the minority's remedy for the situation is not a divorce and property settlement but, on

the contrary, the exclusion of the possibility of breakup and the determination to make a united appearance in the next elections.

The card game of old maid has once again been played on the FCP leadership, which has a crucial step before it next weekend: the Central Committee must carry out its threat and expel the eight district organizations led by the minority. Expulsion is such a severe measure in the communist movement that Aalto had undoubtedly hoped the minority would depart voluntarily. Now the intention is to "declare" the district organizations "expelled from the FCP" on the basis of their reply.

Does the expulsion finally mean the endpoint to the double life--it has lasted more than 15 years--in the FCP and the latter's split into two separate communist parties? Not yet, evidently, although the course of development seems indisputable. Even after expulsion of the minority districts, the minority's party divisions and private individuals remain FCP members for the time being, if they want to, and may participate in the activity of the Finnish People's Democratic League. It is unclear to some degree how the divorce and property settlement will be brought to a formal end.

For a long time the minority's radical wing has singlemindedly espoused the establishment of a new communist party. The minority's leaders are held in check only by the perpetual vacillation of CPSU comrades. The FCP's formal breakup is experienced in Moscow as a loss of prestige for the CPSU and for the entire international communist movement. Making the bipartition official during the 27th CPSU party congress which convenes in February may be particularly painful.

Many signs indicate that the new winds blowing in Gorbachev's Soviet Union can lead to substantial reappraisals in the attitude toward the communist parties of other countries. Maybe even Arvo Aalto's possibilities for emerging with honor from the disentanglement of the FCP's problems would have been different if administration of the deceased's estate had been postponed for another year.

The strictness of Aalto's timetable has been dictated by the 1987 parliamentary elections, for which the party does not believe it can prepare by pursuing the old course.

12327

CSO: 3617/10

POLITICAL

GREECE

SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE CASE AFFECTS NAVY GENERAL STAFF

Eastern Bloc Refugees

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 26 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] Four political refugees who recently returned from Eastern bloc countries were placed in sensitive positions at the Navy General Staff, specifically in the service that was headed by Lt Vasilis Serepisios. As a matter of fact, they replaced the same number of experienced and trustworthy employees who had occupied those positions before.

This is mentioned in an interpellation addressed to Minister of National Defense A. Papandreou by ND deputies I. Vasileiadis, I. Stathopoulos, Al. Papadongonas, Tz. Tzannetakis, P. Panourgias and S. Gikas.

The ND deputies are noting the planned undermining of the armed forces and the special concern awakened by the handling by the government of the Lt Serepisios affair. The interpellation also stresses that the government is demanding an apology from, and demanding the resignation of superior officers of the Navy under the ridiculous accusation that their minor children demonstrated in favor of the ND, while at the same time allowing the sale within the service of coupons by an officer for the purpose of gathering funds for the KKE. Simultaneously, the government is claiming that Lt Serepisios had no access to secret documents, a fact that was proved wrong, to say the least.

Navy Chief Reportedly Compromised

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 3 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] Vice Admiral Nikos Pappas will leave his position as chief of the Navy General Staff until the end of the year, to be replaced by either Vice Admiral Perisakis or Vice Admiral Vasilikopoulos.

This is mentioned in confirmed press reports, according to which Vice Admiral Pappas is responsible for all the "irregularities" in the Navy and above all, for the espionage case involving Lt V. Serepisios.

According to the same information, "the straw that broke the camel's back" for Vice Admiral Pappas occurred last Monday, when Alternate Minister of

National Defense A. Drosogiannis and GEETHA [National Defense General Staff] chief Gen N. Kouris suddenly inspected the GEN [Navy General Staff] unbeknownst to Pappas.

Obviously upset, Mr Drosogiannis was heard to remark to Vice Admiral Pappas at the end of the inspection tour: "This is not a general staff, this is a KAPI [Old Age Care Center]."

According to political and military observers, the chief of the GEN is being accused, among others, of having lost control and having allowed discipline lapses in this old and glorious branch of the armed forces.

/8208

CSO: 3521/8

POLITICAL

NORWAY

PAPER ACCUSES FRYDENLUND OF AMBIGUITY IN NATO STAND

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Sep 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Security Policy Credibility"]

[Text] Now the Labor Party must think twice. We pointed out earlier that foreign and security policy do not have to be any problem in the next four years. For the compromise from the spring of 1984 provides a good basis for a fruitful debate. But the precondition is that the opposition respect the compromise.

Ex-Foreign-Affairs-Minister Knut Frydenlund's statement in AFTENPOSTEN last Tuesday is, however, ominous. He is simply standing the problem on its head while at the same time he is confirming that the Labor Party, in the opposition position, will continue to undermine our position as a credible alliance partner.

The Labor Party is attempting to ride two horses. On the one hand it is insisted that the party stands united behind our NATO membership. On the hand, the party is in opposition to the negotiation strategy the alliance has developed jointly. The violation of our domestic compromise is regrettable, to speak guardedly, but it is also a natural consequence of the Labor Party's desertion of the alliance's two-track resolution.

It is a tiny bright spot that the opposition's foremost defense policy spokesman promises that the Labor Party during the fall's budget discussion will not vote against the appropriation for NATO's infrastructure program, which, among other things, includes the necessary money for the deployment of any new Western medium-range missiles. But this is little help, considering that Frydenlund is also threatening a new agonizing fight regarding our relationship to the USA's Strategic Defense Initiative.

As we know, the government has quietly, but in wording which cannot be misunderstood, informed the USA that Norway does not want to take part in what it considers the military part of the SDI program. But this does not satisfy the Labor Party, which evidently wants to make Norway a laughingstock by opposing the entire American research program. Frydenlund says straight out that he has nothing against Norway's behaving as a footnote country in the alliance.

That this weakens both the alliance's strength in negotiations with the other superpower and our credibility does not worry him. In any case, he is not expressing any worry. His article is a confirmation of the fact that the Labor Party thinks we should base ourselves on what the party's Vice-Chairman Einar Førde calls the "infighting in NATO."

Just as ominous is the fact that the Labor Party wants to make the demand for an isolated Scandinavian nuclear-free zone a major issue. According to Førde, a Scandinavian action plan ought to be developed which is later to be taken up with our Western allies. In brief, they want to confront NATO with a fait accompli without having regard for the fact that any nuclear-free zone must be seen in a broader European context.

If such a zone move receives a majority in the Storting, the immediate consequence will be a government crisis. At the same time Norway will become a footnote country in NATO. This will be the definitive break with the security policy main line which the Labor Party and the Conservative Party earlier stood together on. We can only repeat our urgent appeal to the Labor Party to think twice before it is too late.

8985

CSO: 3639/1

POLITICAL

NORWAY

CONSERVATIVES' STORTING CHIEF URGES COOPERATION WITH HAGEN

Proposes Appointing Contact Man

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Syse: 'Contact With Progressives Necessary'"]

[Text] Efforts are being made to find a way out of the stale-mated situation between the governing parties and the Progress Party. One of the possibilities which has been suggested is this: The governing parties will select one key person. That person would have full authority on behalf of the three parties' parliamentary groups to discuss solutions to particular issues with the Progressives. "Absolutely a possibility," says Carl I. Hagen to AFTENPOSTEN. The Conservatives' Jan P. Syse will not discuss this possible solution but believes that practical arrangements with the Progressives must be found.

"I believe that the parliamentary situation is such that we must make such arrangements in a correct and orderly manner," the Conservatives' parliamentary leader asserts to AFTENPOSTEN and points out:

"It is necessary that we cooperate with each other right from the beginning of the parliamentary session."

The two parliamentary leaders of the Conservative and Progressive parties recently had a meeting during which Hagen oriented Syse on how his party evaluated certain matters--as he puts it.

"The ruling parties almost have given the impression that we Progressives are lepers. They will not sit in the same room and have discussions with us, etc. If we are to prevent misunderstandings in difficult situations, all of the governing parties must accept the fact that it is necessary to talk to us."

Avoid Chaos

[Question] "Doesn't your parliamentary group want to create crisis situations?"

[Answer] "Of course we do not want any crisis situations arising out of the fact that we have not talked with each other. That is stupid. In our opinion, one of the most important things in Parliament now is for the governing parties to find a way to work in harmony--not the least as respects us. That would create better conditions for everyone. Avoiding parliamentary chaos must be a goal," says Carl I. Hagen.

[Question] "And you count on there being chaos if the three ruling parties do not make contact and clarify various matters with the Progressives prior to important votes?"

Own Proposals

[Answer] "We will pursue our policies and methods of working as previously. The Progressives will put forth their own proposals. If they fail, yes, then we will vote for the next best. If we are to change this, we must receive strong official requests from the three parties concerning why we should not vote for proposals with which we agree. If we receive such requests, we must also get something in return."

[Question] "What do you have in mind?"

[Answer] "I am thinking among other things about budget negotiations in Parliament. Our priorities are clear. When the governing parties see that our views are similar to the beliefs of the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party, they ought to react with an 'aha'. We must get the Progressives to vote some other way. And give them something in return in other matters."

[Question] "Examples?"

[Answer] "The government says that balance in the domestic economy must be maintained. Well, if we, for example, have a breakthrough for our desire to purchase operating capacity in foreign countries, we could say 'No' to increased research grants for Norwegian technical research institutes--a proposal which we, along with Labor and the Socialist Left, think is a necessity. This is mentioned simply as an example."

Not Degraded

[Question] "What maneuvering possibilities do you actually have in this regard? Many view you as degraded after you had to consult with the Progressives' national leadership on difficult matters."

[Answer] "I am not degraded. But as a party chairman who has suffered a significant set-back in the parliamentary election, I personally--and the party--have a need to know that what we are doing in Parliament has the support of the party. I personally took the initiative, formulated and reasoned out why the national leadership should pursue such a measure. If that is viewed as degrading, it is something which I personally wanted to do. Of course, this also involves negotiating measures in Parliament," emphasizes Carl I. Hagen.

Paper Urges Cooperation

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "'Touch and Go' With Hagen"]

[Text] Aside from the last two years, Norway has been governed by shifting minority governments ever since the Borten government collapsed in 1971. Lacking a permanent majority in the halls of Parliament, it has been necessary to find the best possible solutions under the circumstances, which in the current parliamentary situation, is a minority government composed of the Conservatives, the Christian Democrats and the Center Party.

Even though it always will be an additional stress for a government to be in the minority, we have experience in how this method of governing can result in a relatively high level of stability. But it requires that the sitting government demonstrate at all times both flexibility and political acumen. There must be a strategy based on the existing political realities, taking into consideration constructive cooperation with the parties which are in Parliament.

Because we, for our part, believe that it is proper to strive to achieve the broadest possible solutions, in principle, no party should be excluded from such cooperation. This also is in conformity with the practice which has been followed by all of the minority governments in recent times. When the Labor Party had the governing responsibility and by itself constituted a minority in Parliament, the party found support for its proposals on both sides of the political dividing line. It was always a question of being able to tack against the wind in waters where the majority shifted around, depending upon what type matter was involved. We do not think that the Labor Party's soul was damaged for that reason.

When certain groups within the present governing coalition believe that they have the right to ignore the Progress Party--a party which by reason of its two representatives has contributed to the Willoch government even being able to continue--this is an expression of an attitude from which we, for our part, will keep our distance. It is assumed that in the political world, it is a normal custom to be able to talk with each other. Irrespective of what one may think about the Progress Party's policies, there obviously is no reason to act obnoxiously toward the party's chosen representatives.

The poisoned situation we are witnessing concerning the relationship between the governing parties and Carl I. Hagen's party could have been avoided if immediately following the election, one had taken the time for a politically clarifying conversation between the parties which now make up the non-socialist majority in Parliament. Such a discussion--which we ourselves recommended a long time before the election--would have clarified the political positions and also created understanding for the obvious fact that the government naturally cannot pursue /the Progressives'/ policies. We can only regret that the initiative was not taken by the coalition--in our opinion--to accomplish this requisite staking-out of the boundaries. If this had been done, the groups would have known, more or less, where each other stood. Now, they do not.

In order to avoid chaotic conditions in the future, the governing parties should at least attempt to establish consultation arrangements which recognize that the Progress Party exists. Then, Mr. Hagen likely would understand that political biases serve neither him personally nor the political idea which he undertakes to represent.

12578

CSO: 3639/15

POLITICAL

NORWAY

STRONG NATO BACKER NAMED STORTING FOREIGN AFFAIRS PANEL CHIEF

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Oct 85 p 13

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] Cooperative. A mediator. Will work to make committee members move in the same direction, but will not allow himself to be manipulated. This, in a nutshell, is the working style of the new chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament.

Conservative Jan Petersen is probably asking himself the following question, now that the new parliamentary session is beginning: Will the Labor Party use confrontation in all the committees in an attempt to wear down the coalition parties? Or will that party choose to cooperate in the Foreign Affairs Committee?

After all, there are no indications that the foreign-policy and security-policy debate during the election campaign helped the Labor Party. Many people believe that it was this debate that has prevented the Labor Party from achieving its goal in the close elections.

Steady NATO Course

It is perfectly clear that Petersen does not want, nor does he have the mandate of his party, to find the least common denominator to make the committee pull together. A loyal and steady course within the NATO alliance will be maintained.

The committee chairman will attempt to solve any differences that may arise in our relations with the United States in such a way as to prevent any disagreement or distance between us and our most important alliance partner.

Space Weapons

The space-weapons program of the United States could be a controversial issue in the new parliament, as well. The opposition may make an effort to use this issue in an attempt to split the coalition parties. During the last session of parliament, the government laid out its view on space-weapons research point by point. There is no reason to believe that the government will deviate from this view.

Local Government

Jan Petersen is now entering his second term in parliament. For 3 years he was a member of the Local Government Committee. Last year he joined the Foreign Affairs Committee, which he will now chair. The 39 year old made his career in parliament, but no one can accuse Petersen of having "sharp elbows." It is not his style to be pushy. He is known in political circles as a quiet person and a "nice guy."

The lawyer from Oppegard was once party chairman for that municipality--as was Finance Minister Rolf Presthus--and was a member of the town council for 16 years. When he left, he turned over the national chairmanship of the Young Conservative League to Per-Kristian Foss.

From 1975 to 1978, Jan Petersen worked at NORAD (Norwegian Directorate for Development Aid), where he conducted negotiations concerning aid projects in Vietnam, among other things. Petersen describes this period as interesting and instructive.

When the new chairman of the important Foreign Affairs Committee relaxes, he listens to classical music. Italian composers of the 19th century, such as Verdi, Rossini, and Donizetti, are among the favorites of this record collector.

"They are outstanding," Petersen said.

9336

CSO: 3639/18

POLITICAL

NORWAY

POST-ELECTION POLL REGISTERS GAINS FOR PROGRESSIVES, LABOR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen: "Socialistic Election Gains Strengthening"]

[Excerpts] An advance for the socialists and a decline for the governing parties. These are the main trends in today's party barometers from Gallup/NOI [Norway's Opinion Institute]. As is normal with post-election polls, the movements which took place during the election become further strengthened. On paper, it thereby would look as if there would be a change of government if the parliamentary election had been held one or two weeks later.

But this likely involves a so-called "band wagon effect." A large number of the voters likely want to be on the winning side. Therefore, it is not certain that they really would have given the socialistic parties greater support if the election results had not been known. But the poll also can be interpreted along the line that the Labor Party was making slight headway during the election campaign and that this trend has continued.

It is also very seldom that the voters have regrets immediately after an election. One of the few examples of this was the Common Market vote. In that instance, the opinion polls following 25 September and the Danish election showed a majority in favor of Norwegian membership. However, this trend turned later.

The Labor Party can be very pleased over its gains. The poll which was taken during the period 15-30 September gives the Labor Party 41.6 percent, contrasted with 40.8 percent in the parliamentary election. The gain appears to come from all parties except the Conservatives.

The Socialist Left Party, which had a smaller gain in the election than expected, is once again back up in the 6 percent area. This is a 0.8 percent advance relative to the election result of 5.5 percent.

The Conservatives received the biggest smack this month and retreat from 30.4 percent in the election to 29.0 percent. The leakages are thought to go in the direction of the Center Party, which in turn is losing voters both to the parties on the right and to the Labor Party. The net result for the Center Party is 6.2 percent, that is, something under the election result of 6.6 percent.

The Christian Democratic Party is loosing at both ends and a decline from the disappointing election result of 8.3 percent to 7.4 percent smarts relatively speaking the hardest. But it obviously is too early to assert that the party really has fallen to the level of 7 percent.

The only thing which deviates from the election trends is the limited advance for the Progress Party, which was one of the election's big losers. It received 4.5 percent contrasted with 3.7 percent in the parliamentary election. But naturally, this may involve a coincidental fluctuation in the survey.

The Liberals are standing relatively still with 3.3 percent contrasted with 3.1 percent in the election. More decisive than a few tenths of a percentage in one direction or another as concerns the future destiny of this party, however, is what will happen with the election arrangement. With the averaging mandates, the Liberals have good possibilities for returning to Parliament again, but without this, it will be particularly difficult to convince potential voters that a vote for the Liberals is not "being wasted."

	Parliamentary Election 1981	Aug 1985	Parliamentary Election 1985	Sept 1985
	%	%	%	%
A	37.1	37.3	40.8	41.6
DLF	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6
FP	4.5	4.1	3.7	4.5
H	31.8	32.8	30.4	29.0
Kr.F.	9.3	8.9	8.3	7.4
NKP	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
RV	0.7	1.3	0.6	0.6
S	6.6	5.8	6.6	6.2
SV	5.0	5.7	5.5	6.3
V	3.9	2.9	3.1	3.3
Others	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4
Total	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.1
A + SV	42.1	43.0	46.3	47.9
H + Kr.F. + S	47.7	47.5	45.3	42.6
A + SV + V	46.0	45.9	49.4	51.2
H + Kr.F. + S + FP	52.2	51.6	49.0	47.1

Key:

A	Labor
DLF	New Liberal
FP	Progress
H	Conservative
Kr.F.	Christian Democratic
NKP	Norwegian Communist
RV	Radical Left
S	Socialist
SV	Socialist Left
V	Liberal

The figures show how many would vote for a given party in a possible parliamentary election tomorrow out of those who for certain would vote. Inquiry also was made respecting for which party the person had voted in the parliamentary election in 1985. The differences between the various parties' support as shown in the answers to this question contrasted with the actual election results in 1985 were used as weighing factors.

The results are based on interviews with 950 people over age 18. The interviewing occurred during the period 15-30 September, 1985.

The figures in the chart can be seen to confirm the trend which was revealed by our survey prior to the election, namely, that the Labor Party (and SV) won votes during the election campaign while the governing parties lost votes. This trend has continued following the election.

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

SEMINAR, REPORT TO GOVERNMENT WEIGH JOINING SDI PROJECT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik]

[Text] On Wednesday, experts issued a serious warning that Norway and other European countries should not refuse to participate in the American SDI research program. The warnings came during a day-long seminar arranged for specially invited guests by the Study Committee of the Defense Institute Association. At the same time, they called for greater realism and sobriety in the Norwegian debate on SDI--a debate that, so far, has been based on ignorance.

It was precisely this lack of knowledge concerning what SDI, the American dream of a comprehensive strategic defense without nuclear weapons, is actually all about that led the Study Committee of the Defense Institute to initiate a realistic debate. The experts who presented papers included Erik Klippenberg, director of the Defense Research Institute (FFI), and Lt Gen Tonne Huitfeldt. Together with two other researchers, Klippenberg recently completed a report to the government on the extent, content, and direction of the American SDI research. The group visited the United States and talked with administration representatives at all levels. They also visited research laboratories.

Until recently, Huitfeldt was director of the international military staff at NATO headquarters in Brussels. He has followed the progress of SDI within the alliance from an extremely close vantage point. Political representatives at the meeting included undersecretary Oddmund Hammerstad and member of parliament Knut Frydenlund.

In his speech, Klippenberg strongly stressed the enormous technological problems involved in an extensive strategic defense system deployed on platforms in space. Although there are no fundamental scientific obstacles to such a system, its completion lies in the distant future and it is doubtful that anyone alive today will see it. The development of supercomputers and programs to guide the system remains far in the future and there are also other enormous demands on the system. One problem, for example, is to discover and recognize far-off targets. According to Klippenberg, the precision demands may be compared to distinguishing between two points that are 2 mm apart at a distance of 2 km. In addition, he estimates that it would take 100 years

to transport the necessary equipment into space with the present transport system of space shuttles.

It is impossible to distinguish between civil and military research in SDI, according to Klippenberg. He warned against refusing to participate in this research. If we do not participate in the American research program, we will have no insight into the problems that are involved when political decisions must be made sometime in the future. This would mean we would have no influence on these decisions.

The United States is now investing 200 billion kroner over a 5-year period. The SDI program will be the most important development in new technology during the next 10 years. The old industries in Europe are dying out, he said, and SDI will lay much of the groundwork for new industries. Europe is already spending more to import information technology than to import oil and this trend will continue.

Reactions

Lt Gen Tonne Huitfeldt discussed the strategic and security aspects of the SDI plans. He described developments in this field on the Soviet side and demonstrated that the Soviet Union, by linking warning and monitoring systems with defense systems, would soon have a strategic defense system that would protect all of its territory against ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union is probably the leader in various fields, such as particle and laser weapons. The Soviet research effort is hardly less intense than that of the United States, but the Soviet Union has not given this research a collective term, as the Americans have. He also reviewed developments in strategic thinking with regard to offensive and defensive weapons and discussed European reactions to the American SDI plans. He pointed out that the Soviets had admitted that it was the SDI program that had brought them back to the negotiating table in Geneva, but that the United States could hardly agree to cut back its research in this field.

Topic For Talks

"Washington probably has not yet decided whether or not SDI will be discussed in the negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva," member of parliament Knut Frydenlund said. Frydenlund is a former chairman of the Defense Committee, but he is now the primary spokesman of the Labor Party on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Frydenlund wants the European, and especially the Norwegian, governments to advise the United States to include SDI in the negotiations. In this connection, he points to the letter the government sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee on SDI last spring.

Much could be gained if Reagan, during his summit meeting with Gorbachev, declares himself willing to negotiate over SDI. That could serve to convince the Soviet Union to make important concessions. If the Americans are unwilling

to discuss SDI in the negotiations, then Europe could find itself in a serious situation that the Russians would know how to use, he said. He pointed out that Germany, especially, would find itself in a dilemma.

In the speech presented by undersecretary Oddmund Hammerstad, he stated that the most realistic possibility was that in the short term, i.e. during the next 10 to 20 years, the United States would tone down its program for developing SDI to make it a limited defense system. He said that the research was fully permissible in the framework of the ABM treaty. He also pointed out that no change in NATO's strategy would be called for in the near future as a result of SDI.

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

BORDER COMMISSIONER DESCRIBES WORKING WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Oct 85 p 40

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] "To the extent that it is possible to have a friendly relationship with a representative of the communist Soviet Union, former border commissioner Aleksandr Ivanovich Tymko was my good friend. Good relations with my counterpart on the other side of the border are a precondition for my being able to do the job on the Norwegian side. Like most KGB officers, Aleksandr Ivanovich is a member of the Communist Party. It is certain that his recent successor, Vladimir Leonidovich Kirillov, also is a party member," Norwegian border commissioner Col Inge Torhaug said.

"There is a friendly tone in our conversations. Temperature changes in the climate between Moscow and Washington do not affect our daily talks up here on the northern border. Norway is probably the country with which the Soviet Union has the most friendly relations with regard to boundary questions," Colonel Torhaug said.

Early each fall he travels along the border, together with his Soviet counterpart. All 412 boundary markers must be inspected. In addition, they must make sure that the three border towns in the Barents Sea are in the correct location. A total of 196 km must be inspected.

Although the Soviet border commissioner, like his Norwegian counterpart, is trained as an officer, both Aleksandr Ivanovich Tymko and Vladimir Leonidovich Kirillov are employees of the Soviet Interior Ministry. Because of their positions, they are automatically attached to the KGB.

"In order to assert Norwegian sovereignty on the border, I must learn to look him in the eye," Col Inge Torhaug said.

Norway has a company of border guards from the garrison in Sor-Varanger that guards the boundary constantly, in accordance with an agreement between the two countries and with Norwegian law.

The Soviet Union has 17 border-guard camps with 40 to 50 men at each station. The training school for these forces is in Salmijarvi. This school accepts

500 recruits once each year. The guard force on the Norwegian border, the size of a battalion (850 to 1,000 men), is part of the 300,000-man border guard with which the Soviet Union has surrounded itself. The KGB's border troops are under the authority of the Interior Ministry.

Different Systems

How are the standards of the Soviet recruits, compared to those of the Norwegians? The boundary commissioner, Col Inge Torhaug, refused to comment. But when asked why he worked so hard to understand the Russians, Torhaug responded as follows.

"My counterparts on the other side of the border are official representatives of the Soviet Union. We represent two value systems that cannot be reconciled. If, however, we can maintain friendly relations, then at least we have a good chance of working together in an atmosphere without tension," Torhaug said.

Col Inge Torhaug has a background in both the Norwegian intelligence service and in the security service. He does not support "Finlandization" of the Norwegian border policy in the north. There is no talk of establishing zones that tourists would be prohibited from visiting.

"Norwegian soil is Norwegian soil, but obviously practical politics is a balancing act. If we have greater understanding for how they think, this does not mean that we will operate on their terms. We must always remember that the largest naval base in the world begins at Pachenga, just 10 km from our border. This base would be vital to the Soviet Union in a conflict with the West. The Soviet Union is a pragmatic nation and clearly understands that Norway needs a solid anchoring in the West. Our NATO membership is a prerequisite for our ability to maintain our sovereignty in our border regions," Col Inge Torhaug told AFTENPOSTEN.

9336

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

POLL INDICATES GONZALEZ, FRAGA CLOSEST TO IDEAL LEADER

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 23 Sep 85 pp 26-29

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] It has no name, but neither is it "under wraps," a last-minute surprise, a reserve kept in a piggy-bank like a gold piece wrapped in a handkerchief . . . It is a hypothetical profile with the features that Spanish voters would like to see in the man to whom they will give their trust and their votes. Many of the current "successive heads" of the political parties possess some of the qualities of the "ideal leader;" but none of them fits this description like the proverbial glove.

Although the calendar has not been set yet, the available facts on the political scene imply that the election campaign has begun: Galician autonomy elections, a hypothetical referendum on NATO, Andalusian autonomy elections, and general elections will all take place within a year. Under these circumstances, the question of the characteristics that are necessary for a political candidate, the /profile/ of the ideal leader, comes to the forefront.

The citizens have been asked about their preferences among the seven qualities that are desirable in a political leader, the degree to which the current top leaders meet those requirements, and other personal characteristics that could also be considered appropriate.

Spaniards value two fundamental qualities in their political leaders: effectiveness and honesty; knowing how to get things done, and doing them ethically. Of all the respondents in the survey, 66 and 63.3 percent, respectively, cited these two elements. In theory, no political leadership could be possible if the candidate did not possess these two qualities in abundance.

Next in order, according to 59.1 percent of the respondents, the leader must be /intelligent./ The next most important attributes are /sincerity/ and /having a good team of advisers,/ for 34.2 and 33 percent of those interviewed, respectively.

The features that Spaniards think of least are /being supported by a strong party/ (19.2 percent) and /proven experience in the management of public affairs/ (15.2 percent).

Intelligence and Party

Felipe Gonzalez received higher marks than any other leader in terms of his possession of the above attributes: 19.5 out of a total of 35 points (each quality was given 1 to 5 points). He also got the best grades in terms of his party (3.3), intelligence (3.1), and team of advisers (2.9). His worst ratings, in contrast, were for sincerity, honesty and experience. Manuel Fraga and Adolfo Suarez surpassed him in the latter ranking.

Manuel Fraga's most outstanding characteristics are the aforementioned experience, and the strength of his party. Among his own constituents (who gave him very high marks, in general) he is also noted for being effective. Socialists and Communists, on the other hand, gave Fraga much lower ratings, although they did acknowledge his experience, the strength of his party, and to a lesser extent, his intelligence.

Much further behind the president of the government and the opposition leader are the leaders of the minority parties. Thus, Gerardo Iglesias received very similar ratings for all the qualities listed, ranging between 1.3 and 1.9 points. Communists, Socialists, and Popular Alliance (AP) members agreed (though in decreasing numbers) that this leader's best features are his honesty and intelligence.

The people interviewed cited experience in public office and intelligence as the main qualities possessed by Adolfo Suarez, former president of the government and leader of the Democratic and Social Center (CDS). His worst ratings were for his team of advisers and his party. Finally, the respondents gave similar ratings to the leader of the PRD [expansion unknown], Miguel Roca, praising his intelligence but criticizing the solidity of his own party.

Professional, Mature and Middle-Class

As for the other socioeconomic characteristics of the political leaders, what do Spaniards prefer? Six out of 10 respondents claimed not to care whether the leader is a man or a woman, although most of the remainder favor a man. Young people favor equality more than adults do; women more than men; Communists more than Socialists; and Socialists more than Popular Alliance members.

As for age, although 44 percent claimed they did not care about that either, those who expressed preference for a given age inclined toward the experience of maturity (45 to 65 years of age). This range was preferred overwhelmingly over other ages, particularly 65 years and over. With regard to profession, there was a clear preference for a higher education (78 percent). Furthermore, the ideal candidate should be in the middle class economically.

The majority of the population is indifferent to the leader's religion, although 34.7 percent prefers a Catholic.

Given this state of affairs, it can be concluded that Spain's ideal leader fits the following robot description: a man 45 to 65 years of age who is a middle-class professional with a higher education, and though he does not have a strong party behind him or recognized experience in public office, he practices politics with clearly established criteria of effectiveness, honesty and intelligence.

Poll directed by: Tecnicas de Comunicacion, Consultores, S.A.

Poll conducted by: SIGMA-DOS, S.A.

Technical data:

Population: People 18 years or older.

Place: Spain, except for the Canary Islands, using 11 autonomous regions as a sample.

Sample: 1,111 interviews, with a possible error of plus or minus 3 percent, for a confidence interval of 95.5 percent and $p/q = 50$, according to the Arkin and Colton tables.

Selection: Random, using the Random Route method, complemented by the quota system to correct for sex, age and profession.

Interviews: Conducted by personal home visits.

Dates of Fieldwork: 1 to 4 August 1985.

Compared to the Model

To what extent do the current leaders of the Spanish political parties possess the qualities of the ideal politician? (1 point: they do not possess that quality; 5 points: they possess it completely)

Quality	F. Gonzalez	M. Fraga	A. Suarez	M. Roca	G. Iglesias
Effectiveness	2.7	2.3	2.2	1.7	1.5
Supported by a Strong Party	3.3	2.8	1.7	1.5	1.4
Surrounded by a Good Team	2.9	2.4	1.8	1.6	1.4
Experience in Managing Pub- lic Affairs	2.6	3.3	2.9	1.7	1.3
Honesty	2.6	2.1	2.2	1.7	1.3
Intelligence	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.2	1.9
Sincerity	2.3	1.9	2.1	1.6	1.6
Total	19.5	17.8	15.7	12.0	10.9
Mean	2.8	2.5	2.2	1.7	1.6

Qualities: A leader should be . . .

Sex: Man

Quality	% Mentions
Effective	66
Honest	63.3
Intelligent	59.1
Sincere	34.2
Surrounded by a Good Team	33
Supported by a Strong Party	19.2
Experience in Managing Public Affairs	15.2

	% Mentions
Don't Care	58.9
Man	38.3
Woman	3.5

Age: Mature

	% Mentions
Don't Care	44.0
Between 45 and 65	30.1
Between 30 and 44	22.4
Between 18 and 29	1.2
Over 65	0.4

Education: Higher

	% Mentions
Higher Degree	78.0
Middle Degree	12.2
Bachelor or Professional Training	3.0
No Degree	1.7
Primary	0.5

Social Status: Middle Class

	% Mentions
Middle Class	67.5
Upper Class	16.8
Lower Class	5.7

Beliefs: Don't Care

	% Mentions
Religion Does Not Matter	57.2
Catholic	34.7
Non-believer	6.9
Other Religions	0.5

Less Talk and More Action

In order of importance, name three qualities from the following list that a political leader should possess:

	Total Mentions by Position			Total	Three Qualities Combined		
	1st	2nd	3rd		PSOE	AP	PCE
Effectiveness	39.8	12.3	13.9	66.0	71.8	71.4	80.0
Supported by a Strong Party	5.0	7.5	6.7	19.2	18.7	22.9	22.5
Surrounded by a Good Team of Advisers	7.2	14.5	11.3	33.0	32.5	33.3	27.5
Experience in Management of Public Affairs	2.3	6.7	6.2	15.2	10.5	15.6	2.5
Honesty	28.9	20.6	13.8	63.3	65.6	57.8	65.0
Intelligence	11.3	24.7	23.1	59.1	61.3	58.3	70.0
Sincerity	4.7	9.4	20.1	34.2	34.4	30.2	32.5

Men, Mature, Well-Educated, Middle-Class

Aside from the political qualities, what personal characteristics should the ideal political leader have?

	Total	Age				Sex		PSOE	Party	
		18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65	Male	Female		AP	PCE
Man	38.3	17.3	33.2	48.9	60.6	46.4	30.5	36.9	54.7	12.5
Woman	3.5	7.6	2.7	2.0	1.2	2.8	4.3	3.3	1.0	7.5
Don't Care	58.9	75.1	63.4	48.6	38.2	50.8	64.5	59.6	43.2	80.0

	Total	Age				Sex		PSOE	Party	
		18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65	Male	Female		AP	PCE
18-29	1.2	4.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.7	0.0	0.0	2.5
30-44	22.4	28.4	26.2	17.0	17.0	22.8	21.9	28.0	15.6	12.5
45-65	30.1	14.2	16.2	41.3	41.2	32.8	27.5	28.7	45.3	22.5
+ 65	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.0	2.5
Don't Care	44.0	50.2	46.3	38.3	41.2	41.3	46.9	41.3	37.5	55.0

Level of Education

	Total	Age				Sex		PSOE	Party	
		18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65	Male	Female		AP	PCE
None	1.7	1.0	2.0	2.8	0.0	1.8	1.6	1.1	0.0	15.0
Primary	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.0	5.0
Bachiller or Prof. Trng.	3.0	5.2	1.0	2.0	4.9	3.1	2.8	3.3	2.6	5.0
Mid. Degree	12.2	15.6	12.4	11.2	7.9	11.6	12.8	13.8	8.3	0.0
High. Degree	78.0	70.2	78.9	80.7	83.6	78.5	77.3	76.7	86.5	57.5

Economic Status

	Total	Age				Sex		PSOE	Party	
		18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65	Male	Female		AP	PCE
Lower	5.7	7.3	3.4	5.0	8.5	7.4	4.1	3.1	0.5	27.5
Middle	67.5	70.9	69.0	64.4	65.5	67.7	67.3	76.9	55.2	45.0
Upper	16.8	14.5	20.7	20.0	0.0	15.8	17.8	11.1	34.9	5.0

Religion

	Total	Age				Sex		PSOE	Party	
		18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65	Male	Female		AP	PCE
Catholic	34.7	17.7	26.5	46.4	53.9	30.3	39.3	24.9	71.4	0.0
Other Relig.	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.9	0.2	0.9	0.0	0.0
Non-believer	6.9	15.2	4.4	3.4	4.9	9.4	4.6	5.1	0.0	17.5
Religion Does Not Matter	57.2	66.4	67.1	49.2	40.6	58.9	55.2	68.4	27.6	82.5

8926

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

MORAN ON POLICY, PERSONALITY CONFLICTS WITH ADMINISTRATION

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 23 Sep 85 pp 18-25

[Interview with former Foreign Minister Fernando Moran by Pilar Urbano, in his Madrid residence; date and time not given; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] He rests his hand on the pointer of the scale. He seeks a balance between irritation and patience, between pride and humility, between a cry of rebellion and silence, a constellation of wounds and stifled complaints. He measures the past and the future. He weighs the value of presence and the worth of absence. It appears to me that he sees on one side the temptation of taking up the banner of that pressure point of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) that is known as the Socialist Left; and on the other side the advice that he "bear with it" for a couple of years in some prestigious foreign mission (the embassy in Paris? the European Commission? the United Nations?), write a couple of books, cultivate a popular image . . . and in 1987, launch his campaign for mayor of Madrid.

"I have not run for or aimed at any office. . . I have not asked for anything, and nothing has been offered to me. Nor has there been any opportunity, and that is the truth. I have not talked to President /Gonzalez/ since the crisis in July . . . He has not called me. I expect he will eventually, and then it will be much more important to know what he thinks than to know what I want."

/Fernando Moran/ knows how to move about and remain calm in the labyrinth, without losing Ariadne's thread. Now he is calm, in the semi-darkness of his home in Madrid, leaning back in an armchair, smoking one Winston after another, listening to the news on the transistor. Close by is a phone that does not ring. He notices my glance in that direction, and comments: "Well, now the president is traveling. Let's wait . . . until he returns."

"I Am Not Bitter"

[Question] Your firing came as a surprise, without explanation, without immediate "recompense," as in the case of your former colleague /Miguel Boyer./ Are you bitter?

[Answer] I do not think a surprise firing damages anyone's reputation. Other actions can hurt more . . . I do not think any minister needs to be "compensated" for anything. I am a foreign policy professional, and if I am asked to help or serve in some office, I will do so. I am a deputy, and as of the 17th I plan to attend the sessions of Parliament. Believe it or not, I am not bitter, not against /Felipe Gonzalez/ or anyone else. I am not going to get into it with Moncloa. I know how to be loyal. This government is my government, and the PSOE is my party. I do not feel that I have been pushed aside or mistreated . . .

[Question] If you were to sum up your term as minister, . . .

[Answer] The result would be very positive. It has been the most absorbing and interesting experience in my life. I have not done all that I wanted to, but I have done a lot, many important accomplishments.

[Question] That is my impression. Why is the PSOE behaving with the cocky self-assurance of a party that knows for sure it will win again?

"PSOE Will Win Easily"

[Answer] Because it is going to win again. That is also my impression. It will win easily. But mind you, it will not be because of the strategy outlined by the PSOE leadership, which has been to dilute the Socialist message, but because the country continues to yearn for reform and change--far-reaching reform and change. The only agent capable of bringing about that reform is still the PSOE. Moreover, I do not think that the personality of the leader will have much impact on the coming elections. The engine of the Socialist triumph in 1986 will not be the PSOE party machine and its mobilization, or the leader /Felipe Gonzalez/ and his marvelous ability to communicate--though by saying that I do not mean to deny their obvious importance. No, the triumph will come about because of the society itself, which will issue a new mandate for comprehensive reform.

[Question] How do you know that? Do you have a crystal ball?

[Answer] No, but I can tell you in all modesty that just as I have been badly misunderstood, I know how to communicate. And in the many people who call me or talk to me, I can see their desire to give the PSOE another chance.

[Question] The logical question is, Why? Why not give the right a chance? Are you one of those who feel that outside of the PSOE, there is no one who can govern properly?

[Answer] Not at all. I do not deny anyone's right to be an alternative. Nor am I all upset about the right-wingers taking power. But I think it will take some time yet.

It Is Possible to Be in Europe and Not in NATO

[Question] We were talking before about summing up your term. . . Have you been able to do what you wanted, or have you been hamstrung as a minister?

[Answer] There are still some things I would have liked to finish up, including Gibraltar and the U.S. bases, but I have done what I set out to do, and with great coherence. First of all, I have been able to take a liberal-conservative organic body, the diplomatic corps, and make it work under a Socialist government without altering its structures. I have been able to win the loyalty of this service, and it is as loyal to me as it was to the rightist government in its day. Secondly, I have projected an image of Spain as a Western country that is part of Europe; I have not had to adjust this image to what others want, but rather to Spain's own interests. I have always advocated joining the European Economic Community (EEC) no matter what decision we made in terms of defense, unless we opted to become neutral or to join the Eastern bloc. But I made it clear that we could join Europe, and we have done so, regardless of whether or not we have joined the military organization of NATO, or what is more, negotiated our ability not to join it. which is possible . . .

[Question] Excuse me for interrupting. There is one policy measure that commits President /Gonzalez,/ and that is the famous "decatalogue."

[Answer] Which I support, in its precise terms, without equivocation. How could I not support it, if I was one of the people, or the person, who helped the president by giving him the ideas that went into that "decatalogue"?

[Question] The policy on the United States--was it also tailored to suit you, or was it formulated against your advice?

[Answer] I have tried to develop a sound policy with regard to the United States. Curiously--and now I can say this--when our administration took office I defended continued ties with the United States, against other very "conservative" ministers who were the darlings of the right, and who wanted to denounce the Treaty . . .

[Question] What "conservative" ministers? /Solchaga, Serra, Barrionuevo, Solana/ . . .?

[Answer] And more! Even more "powerful"!

(He is clearly not going to say it. But the list lacks only one name of a minister who was the "darling of the right," /Miguel Boyer./)

"England Will Accept a Solution for Gibraltar"

[Question] So what a surprise! You were pro-Yankee?

[Answer] Ha, ha, ha! Maintain the ties, yes, but without dependence; have a bilateral relationship on matters of defense, yes, but without claiming that everything that suits the Pentagon's interests suits Spain's interests. And all this has been accepted, in one way or another, by the government. So were my efforts to establish an equilibrium in North Africa, which I think were successful. And my efforts to significantly improve our relations with two of our traditional "partenaires": France and Great Britain. I have helped, and

not a little, to clear the way for reaching an understanding with those two countries. The culmination of my endeavors was the arrangement for our King /Juan Carlos/ to visit Great Britain in April 1986. That will be very important in terms of English public opinion. To clear the way for that understanding, I had to fulfill a prerequisite: get the Gibraltar matter going. And I must mention the skill displayed by Sir /Geoffrey Howes/ and the dedicated efforts of my assistants /Mariano Berdejo/ and /Mayans./ We have brought about a detente in the area, and I am convinced that if we do not lose this momentum, if we persist, in 4 or 5 years the British will accept Spanish sovereignty as a solution to the Gibraltar situation.

[Question] /Felipe Gonzalez,/ in China, showed himself more willing to be patient . . .

[Answer] Patience is fine, but it must be accompanied by persistence. I have talked about this with the politicians who preceded me at the head of "Santa Cruz": /Cortina Mauri, Areilza, Oreja, Perez Llorca/ . . . and we all agree that "the recovery of Gibraltar is only of interest to the people and the Foreign Ministry." Tenacity is the key to that issue.

(The art of interviewing also involves tenacity and patience. I am waiting for /Moran/ to let his guard down for a moment so that I can again find the chink in his armor: his disagreements with the government, the circumventing of his efforts, the sudden firing . . . And meanwhile, I must pay strict attention to what he wants to tell me about: his diplomatic achievements.

He leaves the room and comes back with an armload of six large journals, in which his trips, his international contacts, his interviews or telephone conversations, all are recorded day after day, hour after hour, . . . real state secrets.)

Secret Interview that Determined EEC Membership

[Answer] I am going to reveal a few things. . . It is no longer imprudent. It has to do with some very crucial moments in Spain's relations with France, not just commercial ties, but also political. When the EEC negotiations were underway, the night of 23 March, there was a secret and very heated meeting between /Roland Dumas/ and myself, at his country home near Burdeos. It took place the night of the 26th and the early morning of the 27th, and there we agreed to everything that would enable us to reach the final agreement in Brussels the following day, Thursday the 28th. . . You see, I have been working on this matter since 1983. When the Conference on Security and Disarmament opened in Stockholm in January 1984, I already knew, point by point, what France was going to do . . . What I am telling you has never been revealed before. /Cheysson/ told me that in February, /Mitterrand/ would clear away the obstacles to our entry in the EEC, and that at the summit conference in Fontainebleau it would be decided that we would join in January 1986. /Mitterrand's/ reasoning was that if France has privileged ties with Germany and also with Spain, then France becomes the hub of Europe. I responded to /Cheysson,/ so that he in turn could tell /Mitterrand,/ that the quid pro quo would be Spain's joining the EEC and significant cooperation with regard to terrorism.

[Question] In other words, you would turn the tables on the French . . .

[Answer] Yes, and that has been done.

(He flips through the pages in one of the journals, the one for 1983. Then he goes on.)

[Answer] I managed to prevent the rupture of commercial ties with France when they were about to blow up . . . When I went to Tunis, in November 1983, when our trucks were being burned and tampered with at the border, and they were not cooperating with us at all to combat terrorism. Tensions were running very high, and both sides were contemplating, if not breaking off commercial relations, at least impeding trade. I vigorously objected, and threatened to leave the government. At that time, defending the French side meant running the risk of being misunderstood . . .

[Question] How are those relations now? It appears that /Felipe Gonzalez/ is keeping his distance from the French: the jet fighter, the "Eureka" project, etc. . . .

[Answer] Yes. Now I think that we are at a low point, with the doubt about "Eureka." But I don't know why that is. My argument, which President /Gonzalez/ felt was correct, was that even in the event that the French rightists won the upcoming elections, it would be a good idea to cement as many agreements as possible with France now, so that a new government there could not undo what the Socialists accomplished. When he explained the July crisis, /Felipe Gonzalez/ stated that the economic and foreign policies pursued to date would be continued. If there has been or will be any change, we will find out soon enough . . .

[Question] To finish up this chapter, since you are an expert on North African affairs, tell me whether the claims Morocco makes every once in a while on the provinces of Ceuta and Melilla are anything to be concerned about.

[Answer] They may be. When we took office, everyone thought we would have bad relations with Morocco. But it was not going to be like that. As far as Spain is concerned, North Africa is not as important as Europe, but it is more dangerous. If the Islamic fundamentalist radicals in that area decided to launch an armed attack, our army would be forced to intervene, without time to reconsider. All we have to do is look at history. An army frustrated by failure or swelled by victory would feel an overwhelming temptation to become involved in politics . . . For this reason, one thing I have tried to do--and I devoted many hours, many trips and many meetings to it--is to maintain a balance of interests with each country in the Maghreb.

"Felipe Did Not Explain My Firing"

[Question] I have been asking myself a very simple question for quite some time now. It is clear that you not only did nothing wrong, but actually did quite well. Why, then, did Mr /Gonzalez/ decide to let you go?

[Answer] I'd like to know the answer to that question myself! Mr /Gonzalez/ gave me no explanation. And it is true that I found out I was being removed from the government and replaced by /Fernandez Ordonez/ when the president of the Federal Republic of Germany told me.

[Question] Did Moncloa bypass you? Was there "parallel diplomacy"?

[Answer] I have battled obstinately to make sure all foreign policy goes through my office, through "Santa Cruz," independently of whatever advisers the president may have. A multiple foreign policy, with "parallel diplomacy,"--to say nothing of divergent policies!--leads to errors and contradictions. I can only tell you that I have struggled to prevent that. Among other reasons, a foreign minister needs a tremendous amount of autonomy as a political agent.

[Question] Heavens! It was even reported that the president would not meet with you or talk on the phone with you whenever you requested it.

[Answer] I categorically deny that! I never even tried to gain access to the president during that /Ugly July,/ if that's what you're asking. That was fine! The reason is very clear: As a minister, I owed political loyalty to my government and to Parliament.

[Question] And how did it happen that you did not see the cabinet crisis coming? Why did it take you by surprise?

[Answer] Look, /Pilar,/ in 1984 I spent 93 days outside Spain taking care of my duties. In 1983 I spent another ninety-something days outside the country. I have traveled to Brussels 27 times to negotiate the EEC. I have not had the chance or the time to go around snooping into whatever was cooking in domestic politics. Furthermore, as you know, I am not in the president's inner circle.

[Question] Did you two have disagreements?

[Answer] When there were disagreements, they were not important. Sometimes the president would repeat my own words in explaining certain issues to other people. Other times, since he is very imaginative, he would change the arguments around, and I would have to disagree. But never on essential matters. Another thing is that we are very different in temperament, age and educational background . . .

[Question] What about Minister /Serra/? For example, in the controversy over NATO . . .

[Answer] With /Narcis Serra,/ on that point, we have had different "interpretations," but not personal clashes. I do not believe it is necessary for us to join the military organization, that's all. Our contribution to the defense of the West can be done inside or outside the Alliance, and we can maintain a great deal of autonomy.

[Question] Yes, I understand. But on one occasion, the same day you stated that in public, Minister /Serra/ was meeting with the European ministers of defense, with all the lights and cameras . . .

[Answer] I sincerely do not believe that anything /Serra/ has done necessarily means that Spain's military participation in NATO is being planned.

[Question] Looking at the incident from the outside, doesn't it seem to you that a rather large number of people were responsible for the "error" in /Felipe Gonzalez'/ itinerary on his journey to Peking?

[Answer] Large number . . .? That could be an indication that at Moncloa, in the president's office, decisions should not be made without coordinating them closely with the Defense and Foreign Ministries.

(There is a silence. /Moran/ does not want to say any more. I think he has suggested enough. Suggesting is the delicate way diplomats have of "saying without saying." I pick up another matter that was left hanging.)

"The Personalization of Power Should Not Continue"

[Question] Can you describe this "second mandate" you say the people will give the PSOE?

[Answer] The PSOE will have to go further with the Socialist message, both in the sectoral economies and in the policy on autonomy, as well as civil liberties. It will also have to clarify our international position without ambiguity. Moreover, that mandate will have more personal facets than the current one. What I mean is that they will be more diversified. Now there are more prestigious, well-educated and experienced personalities in the PSOE, because they have held office in the autonomous and municipal governments. At the risk of being misunderstood, I will say that the personalization of power that is now focused on /Felipe Gonzalez/, which is still necessary today, should not continue indefinitely. To be sure, the country has demanded that we give the impression of a firm government, but that style of charismatic personalism . . . I don't think it should continue.

[Question] Has the "guy dressed in corduroy" changed much, now that he is president of the government?

[Answer] My president. That should be very clear. You will see . . . I have had the most dealings with him since he came into power. There is no doubt that he has moved beyond the excessive adulation for something as fleeting as youth, and has become more mature. He has "come of age." In addition, the office itself, with the inevitable trappings of power, has given him a new look, a new brilliance. He has gained experience, and that is apparent. And he likes the external signs of authority. That may be right, because the people, as I said, want to be ruled with authority. Especially our people, who have always been dominated by aristocracies, oligarchies and authoritarian regimes . . . It is the same whether we're talking about a political boss, a military ruler, or a strong man. But I think that we are moving toward a

kind of leader that will do tremendously decisive things for the country without having to put on the halo of the savior. I do not think that /Felipe Gonzalez/ considers himself a savior. But there will be increasing numbers of "civilian" politicians, ordinary men like /De Gasperi, Adenauer and Churchill,/ who have struck a healthy balance between charisma and pragmatism. /Felipe Gonzalez'/ second term will be that of a more accessible, normal president who is more aware that what has triumphed is democracy and progress, and that the personalization of power is, fortunately, less necessary.

[Question] Without recalcitrant gestures such as the Azor case, right?

[Answer] Hmmm! I would prefer not to get into a discussion of that episode. It may have been a calculation to nationalize state goods, or . . . to discredit and demystify an era of the past. I don't know. The ultimate meaning is beyond me. I only know that sensibilities on both the left and the right were wounded.

"I Armed Myself with Patience to Endure the Jokes"

[Question] And the record for jokes has almost been broken. I say "almost," because you came away the winner. Did they bother you very much, or . . . did you laugh at them?

[Answer] I armed myself with patience to endure them. It was a campaign, orchestrated by I don't know whom, an abrasive, caustic campaign. I was concerned about it continuing, because I had some "clients" who go with this job and what it represents: ambassadors, diplomats, the Ministry staff, foreign delegations accredited here in Spain . . . And it was very disturbing and upsetting that they might think I was being discredited or maligned in my own country. But curiously, for all the jokes, I was at the top of all the lists for popularity and acceptance.

[Question] Well, . . . you did not do much to protect your image. You were always photographed with a cigarette dangling from the corner of your mouth, your glasses sliding down your nose and your pants wrinkled . . .

[Answer] I didn't give a hoot! There is no way I can ever head a government now. But in 10 or 15 years, the chief of the government here will be an avuncular type like me, a serious professional who doesn't give a damn about his image, if you'll pardon my language.

[Question] In the "PSOE-Felipe Cult," what is left in socialism that a /Pablo Iglesias,/ an /Indalecio Prieto,/ an /Enrique Tierno,/ a /Nicolas Redondo,/ a /Gomez Llorente/ or a /Moran/ could endorse?

[Answer] There is no doubt that we must continually adapt to keep up with the times. Today the class struggle cannot be presented in the terms that /Marx/ outlined. The classes have become much closer economically and culturally; and the middle classes have become proletarianized. Today nationalizations do not make much sense. But to go from there to say that "they are reactionaries" . . .! Equality is still a socialist objective. On the other hand, the law of supply and demand, in the style of the Chicago School, has

nothing to do with socialism, never has, and never will. The struggle for peace does, however. And the promiscuity and dealings with the "Jet Set" do not. There are still plenty of distinguishing marks to tell us what is and is not leftist.

[Question] Yes, but you confuse us terribly! Now it can even be said that everyone has become a monarchist. . .

"The PSOE Will Not Change the Form of Government"

[Answer] Well, I have known /Juan Carlos/ personally since the /Franco/ days, and I have the utmost respect for him, a tremendous fondness and affection for him. My relationship with the king has always been the best. As for /Juan,/ I have been in constant contact with him in Estoril since 1964. But I will answer your question. No one here is a monarchist in essence. A parliamentary monarchy like ours is a very good system, but it is very delicate. I think the king is doing a very good job, by intuition. I do not at all believe that the PSOE, or anyone in the government, has any idea of changing the form of government. It works fine the way it is.

[Question] As long as the king does not become a showpiece, on a pedestal high above reality.

[Answer] Of course! The moderating influence of the king is indispensable. And Article 56 of the Constitution gives him a lot of leeway. But the system can get out of kilter either due to the king's deficiency, absence or abdication, or due to excessive interference, "burning" the king by causing him to intervene in matters where he does not belong . . .

[Question] Have your correligionists in the Socialist Left (IS) tempted you to take up the banner of that faction?

[Answer] No one has offered me anything . . . yet. Only a publisher in Barcelona: 5 million pesetas for my memoirs.

[Question] Don't accept! That would be political suicide.

[Answer] No, I have said no. But I am writing a couple of books of essays. As for the Socialist Left, I will tell the truth: I think it is a good sign that this faction exists and has received a 16 percent approval rating. Self-criticism is always healthy. I participated in the formation of the IS, in 1979. But now I am not favorably disposed to join in intraparty disputes. . . although I will not give up my political life.

[Question] Within the PSOE?

[Answer] Within the PSOE, but with my own opinions and judgments, even if I am disciplined.

[Question] Are you saving yourself to run for mayor of Madrid in 1987?

[Answer] No. Due to my great friendship with /Enrique Tierno,/ not only do I want him to continue being mayor for a very long time, but I won't even allow myself to think about replacing him.

[Question] Would you return to being a minister under /Gonzalez/?

[Answer] Yes.

"My Firing Was Incongruous"

[Question] Finally, did you go through a personal crisis after the "crisis"?

[Answer] No. I never thought I would be foreign minister forever. But I was indeed surprised at the incongruity of firing me after I successfully negotiated our entry into the Common Market. I was gratified by the support I got from people, the concrete evidence of my popularity in the streets, and the expressions of esteem from my European colleagues . . . I saw that my work and efforts were recognized. But I did not have a personal crisis. I did not need to go to any retreat . . . I discovered that I have a lot of resources to draw on so that I can earn a living doing something interesting. And believe me, I do not feel "unemployed," nor am I "at odds with myself."

The peacocks who condescend to glance over their shoulders at him disdainfully and the wags who tell jokes late at night for lack of anything better to do, should be aware that /Fernando Moran/ is a great politician, a good diplomat, and a cultural diamond in the Socialist rough, the Socialist menagerie that includes young chickens and turkeys who usually regard with scorn the swan in their midst. I have not read about it in any newspaper, but I ask him and he confirms that /Mitterrand/ has awarded him with the title of "Great Officer" of the Legion of Honor. I think that only /Castiella/ has received such an honor. And before him, Socialist Minister /Barcia/ and /Manuel Azana./ There was good reason for such a reward: France's gratitude to the man who thawed the ice of our mutually chilly relations and at a given moment saved them from a dangerous rupture. One day, walking through the gardens of La Granja, the then foreign minister of France, /Claude Cheysson,/ told his colleague /Moran/: "You and I will have done something very important for our countries; yes, but later on no one will remember . . ." How prophetic.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

PUJOL: PSOE USING ECONOMIC MEANS TO UNDERMINE AUTONOMIES

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 23 Sep 85 pp 21-23

[Interview with Jordi Pujol, president of the Generalidad of Catalonia, by Antonio Trujillo; date, time and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Politically, what is the significance of the financial cuts proposed by the Socialist government for the autonomous communities?

[Answer] For us, autonomy is a political fact; it is the granting of political and decision-making power. But without money, that power is meaningless, and the only result is to make a mockery of self-government; it becomes ineffectual and superfluous.

[Question] In economic terms, what consequences will Catalonia suffer?

[Answer] Catalonia has been facing this problem for some time now, and the only thing that got us through this plight was the idea (which was never denied by the central administration) that the 1986 budget would be based on more objective criteria, and therefore would be less discriminatory. One thing I can say is that without the indebtedness the Generalidad has incurred (96 billion pesetas), practically no new investment would have been possible in Catalonia. This situation cannot continue. The current system is an aberration, so much so that the more responsibilities we have, the less money we receive.

[Question] Could the Generalidad return some responsibilities to the state?

[Answer] No. Anyway, some communities--with fewer problems than we have--have done so.

[Question] Will the Generalidad maintain a policy of solidarity with the other autonomous communities and the city governments, which have been affected by the same financial cutbacks in the State Budget?

[Answer] We have always had an attitude of solidarity. The proof is that the central administration spends 2,807 pesetas per capita in Catalonia, compared to an average 6,198 per capita in the country as a whole. For transferred funds and services, the communities with levels of transference similar to our

own receive 24,046 pesetas, while we receive 16,858. And this disparity is much more obvious if we compare ourselves with the autonomies with special governments. So we have already demonstrated our solidarity, and we still are. But now we are not going to allow them to put us in a situation of utter despair. While ours is not the only mistreated autonomy, it is certainly the most severely mistreated one.

[Question] What about the city governments?

[Answer] I must say that the cities are another problem. The purviews of the state administration (to which the Generalidad belongs) and the local administration must be clearly separated--conceptually, politically, and economically.

[Question] What political motives lie behind the Socialist government's decisions regarding the autonomous communities?

[Answer] Rather than answering that question directly, I will say that the issue is not strictly--or even primarily--an economic one, although the main method of strangling autonomy may be economic. The basic problem is one which we have been denouncing for some time: either the central government has decided to dismantle the autonomy system, or its idea of autonomy is absolutely ridiculous.

[Question] Do you believe that the autonomy policy of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) is a consequence of the secret pacts signed by Felipe Gonzalez and Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo a few months after the attempted military coup on 23 February?

[Answer] The only thing we know for certain is that after 23 February, the reversal of the autonomy process began.

[Question] What basic criteria should govern the new formula for financing the Catalanian autonomy?

[Answer] Objective criteria, such as income, the domestic product, the population, the territory, . . . that is what the Statute provides for.

[Question] Isn't it a privilege for Catalonia to be able to negotiate a new financing formula, considering that the other autonomous communities, except for Euskadi and Navarre, are prohibited from doing so?

[Answer] I reiterate: That is what the Statute provides for. On the other hand--and this should be guaranteed for all--the Constitution provides that no autonomous financing system (including those of the special governments) should entail any discrimination against the other communities or citizens. But we are very far from running the risk of enjoying privileges. Now we are merely trying to eliminate the overwhelming discrimination to which we are being subjected.

[Question] Do the problems between the central government and the autonomous communities have economic or political origins?

[Answer] Actually, the issue is much more political than economic. What is the autonomy system? Do the Spanish regions and nationalities really want autonomy, or has the entire autonomy system been the product of a perception of discrimination, an illusion? Did the PSOE regard the autonomy movement as just a means of undermining the Democratic Center Union (UCD), and does it feel that it is time now to drop that gambit? Even in the particular case at hand, the autonomous financing, our complaint has as many political grounds as economic ones. Specifically, we are protesting the fact that we were unable even to discuss seriously our proposal of 15 February, a proposal that applied to all of Spain. Moreover, we are upset that the central government, with the decision it has made now, is challenging legally established norms: Article 45 of the Statute, Article 13 of the first transitory provision of the LOFCA [expansion unknown], and Article 138 of the Constitution.

[Question] In the recent celebration of Catalonia's National Day, six Spanish flags were burned, several "Molotov cocktails" were thrown, and buildings flying the Spanish flag were stoned. Is there any connection between these events and the Madrid government's policy?

[Answer] It is true that some commandos went out and committed those acts. These were isolated incidents which have had no real impact and have no general support. They may be trying to capitalize on the consternation and growing disappointment that people feel toward the central administration, but they probably would have perpetrated these acts no matter what. For several years now, some uncontrolled groups--probably provocateurs--have been carrying out such actions. In any case, if they harm anyone, it is the government of the Generalidad and those of us who want to reinforce a constructive feeling of Catalanian identity and a general feeling of unity in Catalonia, and also to convey a positive political message to Spain as a whole. As a matter of fact, this year my party, the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC), decided to celebrate the "Diada" 70 kilometers from Barcelona to avoid the acts of provocation, regardless of their origin.

[Question] You have protested the Spanish Television (TVE) coverage of the "Diada."

[Answer] The coverage of the "Diada" by TVE, National Radio and some newspapers was scandalously biased. They gave the impression of a lot of tension and some major confrontations that never took place. This doesn't have much impact in Catalonia, but in the rest of Spain it gives us a very unpleasant and negative image. I think that due to partisanism and sectarianism, some media cause a lot of damage. To Catalonia and to all of Spain. This is disgraceful. And I say this not as an individual or as a Catalanian politician, but as a person who is answerable to all of Spain, who must promote mutual respect, good relations and understanding. Stirring up passions, which fortunately are shared by only a few, does not serve the truth or the common good.

[Question] Is there a danger that Felipe Gonzalez' policy will ruin the autonomy system?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] If that were to happen, what political channels would remain open?

[Answer] We would have to start from the beginning again.

[Question] Do the leaders of the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC) understand Catalonia's situation and needs?

[Answer] The leaders of the PSC are in a very difficult position, and I must try not to make it any more difficult. They have also rejected Solchaga's proposal with respect to Catalonia, and assert that Catalonia is the one area where the Madrid government has failed. But it is natural for them also to feel the need to criticize the Generalidad government. And of course, they are obliged to find a way to be in the opposition in Catalonia without weakening either the country or the Generalidad, especially with regard to the defense of the Statute in political, cultural, economic, linguistic and other terms. I think that there can be a mutual understanding of both sides' problems and difficulties.

[Question] When did you last talk with Felipe Gonzalez?

[Answer] On 23 July 1984.

[Question] What is the president's response to the Generalidad's proposals?

[Answer] In the economic sphere, nothing. In the political sphere, until a few weeks ago we had received no comment from him on the problems of autonomy in general, and of Catalanian autonomy in particular. But the most important response has been the events that are happening in all areas, not just the economy. In the political, cultural and institutional spheres, the government's policy is to pull back on autonomy and to withdraw increasingly from Catalonia's problems and aspirations.

[Question] How do you think the Catalanian people feel about the PSOE's policy?

[Answer] Disappointed. Their attitude is: "It looks like this time things aren't going to turn out well, either." I feel that I am capable--and I think the leaders of Catalonia are, too--of keeping up the spirits of the people and encouraging them to continue onward. Fortunately, in Catalonia people get along well together; we have a significant feeling of unity and confidence in ourselves and our institutions. Thus equipped, we can accomplish a lot. But confidence in Spain's overall policy is eroding; we fear that we will once again become a passive and excluded element. I mean excluded as a people and as a collective entity.

[Question] In view of all these difficulties, have you been tempted to give up?

[Answer] No. I began to participate in politics at the age of 16, in 1946. And not just in the Spanish University Union (SEU). I have been in jail, I

have been confined. I have been severely attacked many times, under Franco and since Franco. In other words, I have undergone training.

[Question] Can the people of Catalonia feel it?

[Answer] Catalonia has also been trained for these undertakings. It is a little naive politically; it wants to do things, and often it gets overconfident. And then comes the disappointment. That is what is happening now. But those who regard this as a fragile country are fooling themselves. Its language, its own culture, its historical experiences, its strong civil society, its affinity for work, all this is its salvation. The danger is simply that it might turn inward. What is in jeopardy now is not the Catalanian people's will to survive or their decision to maintain their identity; quite the contrary. It is autonomy, and in the collective sense, the Catalonians' hopeful and constructive participation in the common endeavors of Spain. In any case, one thing is certain: We have made some commitments to Catalonia and to Spain as a whole, and we will not let them down.

8926

CSO: 3548/6

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

POLITICIANS, NEWSPAPER CONTINUE ASSESSING ELECTION RESULTS

Falldin's 'Ambiguousness' Hurt Center

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Sharper Center Profile"]

[Text] "Pocketbook issues" is a phrase that has begun to be used in recent election campaigns to describe the very concrete and material controversial issues of policy, such as tax scales and assistance rules. The implication is that they will cause voters to vote one way or another according to a calculation of what various parties are offering the electorate in terms of kronor and oren. The term has the faintly cynical touch of the mass media about it, as if "ordinary people" consider only their own economic advantage in this cut-throat society. It is true that this kind of thing always plays some part in election results but this year's election may represent a kind of voter protest against this underestimation of their idealism in the sense of considering what is best for society as a whole.

The party that has been least associated in the past as well as in the present with pocketbook concerns, the Liberal Party, was the only one that had increased voter support. The "reappraisal debates" held by the other parties should consider the idea that the message might have been as important as the varying ability of party leaders to put it across.

Viewing the voters as a market with different kinds of customer groups that parties can adjust themselves to is another cynical attitude of limited validity. From an international point of view Swedish politicians have been strongly committed either to a certain ideology or to a certain social group or sometimes to both, which they use as a base and personify as a matter of course. The third possibility--advocating group interests that the politician himself is not deeply committed to--is unusual here. However it is common in such countries as Italy, France and, to a certain extent, the United States.

But there are signs that this type is becoming more common: the Conservative Party's young "political broilers" are one example, the SDP's increasingly obvious differentiation of various parts of the electoral market is another (for instance look at this year's "My Vote" posters).

Some people in the Center Party, which had the poorest performance this year, will be sniffing the wind to see what changes could attract votes from one category or another. Historically the party is both in actuality and as it is perceived the vaguest of our five regular parties--with an undefined position on market economy, reform, etc.--with the exception of two areas: its association with agriculture and environmentalism. While the four classic idea parties can lick their wounds after an election defeat and say that their particular "ism" is still intact and just needs to be presented more effectively, it is easy for the Center Party to yield to the temptation to make tactical changes in its profile to the point where its own core of voters cannot explain the real reason for the party's existence.

Hans-Albin Larsson, Olof Johansson's former undersecretary, recently sounded a hopeful note in GOTEBORGS-POSTEN under the title "Rejecting the Social Democrats--Dinstinctive Profile the Center Party's Only Big Chance."

Before the anticipated election defeat some people predicted that the Center Party would now get rid of Thorbjorn Falldin and try to strike deals with the Social Democrats. So far no one seems to have had the desire or the audacity to fulfill the second part of the prediction, but many are calling for Falldin's weary head, without being able to come up with any better alternative. Karin Soder is now apparently handing over the crown prince post of first party vice chairman to Olof Johansson. But he is probably still not regarded as being sufficiently unifying to serve as party leader.

If being "ambiguous" was its biggest problem before the election it would be even worse to have a change of party leadership that treated the head of the party like a scapegoat. The Center Party has a small, shrinking and less and less self-evident core of rural voters who "are" Center voters instead of making a deliberate choice in the matter and a shifting group of generally nonsocialist and/or environmentally-oriented urban residents with a less ideological and intellectual foundation than the typical Liberal voter. The reason why many chose Westerberg instead of Falldin this year could have something to do with the sincerity of the first man and the ulcer problems of the second earlier this year, but it was primarily due to the horse-trading phenomenon of the Dagmar type. Falldin corresponds to people's image of the Center Party more than any other person in the inner circle; it was during the period when he was ill that we saw the culmination of the ambiguousness and internal division.

In Italy there is a phenomenon known as "clientelismo." It means that parties promise certain concrete benefits (wage increases, special legislation, tariff protection, etc.) to clearly specified groups in the hope of getting their votes, without any kind of ideological or rational justification. The system stems from the time of one-man election districts but is now practiced in particular by Center-oriented Christian Democrats. Gunnar Hedlund was in the habit of listing certain groups of people (pension recipients, low wage-earners, small businessmen) in the hope of getting a response, but that was generally as far as it went. Party secretary Jonnergard talked about "blue-collar groups" in the 1950's and Falldin talked about the

importance of manual labor but in reality the Center Party is oriented toward a more cohesive and less group-centered view of society.

In the shelter of the Liberal Party and in relative agreement with it the Center Party should be able to present a clear profile to its moderate average Swedish voters as it awaits the next test of strength. Switching sides has been ruled out and ideological self-effacement could easily lead to a loss of voter support.

Center Party Self-Analysis Overdue

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Oct 85 p 8

[Commentary by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The 1985 election was the fourth defeat in a row for the Center Party. When its representative committee meets on Monday in Stockholm to discuss the election outcome it will conduct the first really serious self-analysis in the Center Party since the government venture with the Social Democrats in 1951-57.

It is something of a puzzle that the Center Party has been able to continue on the same old course through four election defeats. The party simply relied on Thorbjorn Falldin's famous final spurt and ignored all the warning signals.

Now there is serious discontent in the Center Party and some of its deputies want Thorbjorn Falldin's head on a platter. The shock after the fourth straight election defeat is easy to understand. The Center Party has declined from its record high of 25 percent of the vote in the 1973 election to probably less than 10 percent this year if the KDS [Christian Democratic Party] votes are subtracted.

This puts the Center Party in roughly the same position as the old Farmers' Party in 1956 and makes it the smallest nonsocialist party.

There are various reasons for the party's decline. Serving as prime minister forced Falldin to blur the profile of the Center Party and after 1982 the vocal Conservatives took command of the nonsocialist opposition. The reactor exercise and sitting on the sidelines also helped to put the loser stamp on Falldin.

In the 1985 election campaign Thorbjorn Falldin believed to the very last minute that he would be able to mobilize his old voters, primarily on the basis of the struggle for a better environment and a fairer family policy. Opinion poll figures are one thing, election results another, was Falldin's standard comment.

Instead there was a lot of confusion about the Center Party's campaign message. At least three different factions were pulling in different directions. One faction wanted an understanding with the Social Democrats and socially responsible solutions, another argued that the Center Party should have an independent position within the three-party nonsocialist bloc and a third called for a rigid bloc policy.

Falldin was most at home with the group that wanted to give the party an independent position. The reason was that many Center people were uneasy about joining a three-party nonsocialist government under the leadership of a strong Conservative Party.

Party leaders did a double somersault here. They did not believe in the low figures the polls indicated for the party but at the same time they put too much trust in the unrealistically high figures SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] showed for the Conservatives.

The Center Party also created uncertainty among its voters on several issues. The most prominent among them were the Dagmar agreement with the Social Democrats on health care, the KDS agreement on technical election cooperation, a waiting period for health insurance benefits and an abrupt elimination of the value-added tax on food in spite of Falldin's rejection of the idea.

Environmental policy involved a dualism of opinion with agricultural advocates like Thorbjorn Falldin and Anders Dahlgren on one side and environmentalists like Lennart Daleus on the other.

The lack of clarity the Center Party created with regard to its own policy was intensified by the KDS cooperation. KDS leader Alf Svensson's conduct in the election campaign increased the confusion about Center policy.

The most remarkable element was that before the election Alf Svensson advocated a nonsocialist government program while Thorbjorn Falldin was an adamant opponent.

Lack of clarity concerning the Center Party's position on the government issue probably led many farmers to cross over to the Conservative Party. This is suggested by the fact that the Center Party did better in the municipal election than in the parliamentary election, but the KDS cooperation may have also had something to do with this.

Starting in the mid-1960's the Center Party acquired a strong position in the big cities. This was due to the middle-spectrum cooperation with the Liberal Party. This protected the Center Party from criticism by the big liberal newspapers while at the same time after Bertil Ohlin's departure, Gunnar Hedlund developed into a central nonsocialist political figure.

The opportunity to unite the Center and Liberal parties was thrown away at the Uppsala meeting in November 1973.

Center representatives felt a merger was unnecessary since the Liberal Party would be eroded by election setbacks and Thorbjorn Falldin failed to get involved in the dispute.

But things often go up and down in politics. The Center Party will probably have a hard time competing for votes with the Liberal Party in urban areas in the foreseeable future.

After the brilliant spurt in the 1985 campaign Bengt Westerberg is probably the most interesting nonsocialist party leader as we look ahead to the 1988 election. He has introduced a new political debate style and is a natural opposition politician in contrast to Thorbjorn Falldin and especially Ulf Adelsohn.

Many random factors played a part in the outcome of the 1985 election. But there are many signs that Thorbjorn Falldin overestimated his ability to attract voters in the final campaign spurt. Bengt Westerberg was a much more attractive force. The self-created confusion in the Center Party facilitated Westerberg's progress in the last week of the campaign.

In the election analysis that the Center Party must now carry out party people must take into account the Liberal Party's new and fairly prominent role in the nonsocialist bloc as well as the rejection of the Conservative Party's neoliberalism both in Sweden and in Norway.

The reorientation will require a lot of new thinking on the part of Center organs. The main task is to clearly shape the content of an economic policy aimed at rapid economic progress within the framework of a restrained market economy and a just distribution of production results among all citizens.

Another important task is to decide which target groups the Center Party wants to aim at after the re-emergence of the Liberal Party as a major non-socialist party. It should not be impossible to win over voters in small and medium-sized towns and the same is true of the proprietors of small and medium-sized firms.

It will not be possible to elect a new and much fresher party leadership until the party has carried the painful re-evaluation process after four election defeats to a successful conclusion.

Center Party 'Discord' Cited

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Ake Ekdahl]

[Text] The discord within the Center Party about the election cooperation with KDS contributed more to the election defeat than the cooperation

agreement itself. That is the opinion of Riksdag representative Gosta Andersson, one of the two Center ambassadors sent out by the party leadership to forge the agreement with Alf Svensson of KDS.

Around the country and in the Center Party's representative council the cooperation with KDS has been singled out as a basic reason for the party's election defeat. There is already widespread agreement that the cooperation should not be repeated in 1988.

At the same time other Center people have started to warn against blaming all the party's ills on the KDS cooperation. They say the party cannot escape that easily from the critical self-analysis that is now going on.

One of the "engineers" behind the cooperation was Riksdag member Borje Hornlund who has been sharply criticized by his own people. He did not want to make any comments at this time.

"There is a lot to say on this matter but I want to wait until the analysis has been made," he said.

He defended the agreement as a long-term arrangement, in other words one that was set up for a longer time than a single election period.

The other Center negotiator, Gosta Andersson, said that if the KDS cooperation was a problem for the Center Party in the election, it was one the party created for itself. That is because leading Center people handed Palme the arguments against the agreement after having taken part in making the collective decision.

Andersson was thinking of Riksdag colleagues Bertil Fiskesjo and Gunnel Jonang who attacked the agreement before the election for different reasons.

Uncertainty

"This created uncertainty on an important matter and that is the worst thing that can happen to a political party," he said to DAGENS NYHETER.

"It bothers me a little that Hornlund is taking the blame for this. Let us not forget that five representatives of the women's association all expressed positive support of KDS cooperation at the party board meeting where the decision was made."

The five are vice chairman Karin Soder, Ulla Tillander, Alva Hjert, Karin Israelsson and Rigmor Eklund.

Gosta Andersson said the Center Party would be committing a fundamental error and indulging in topsyturvy logic if it pointed to the KDS cooperation as the only plausible explanation for the election defeat. He reminded us that similar plans have been in the air ever since the days of Hedlund and Lewi Pethrus. Even before the 1982 election the Center support was down to 10 percent and there was no KDS agreement to blame that on.

KDS Mistake

At the same time Gosta Andersson was dissatisfied with the way KDS people behaved in the campaign. Their mandate exercise and proposals for ministry posts and written Riksdag motions before a single KDS person had been elected were a mistake.

"I warned the KDS people that this kind of thing can lead to a backlash."

Gosta Andersson regards the arrangement as a decision for the 1985 election and says that both parties must now analyze the advantages and disadvantages of a future repetition.

"I have not taken a stand on whether or not we should repeat this cooperation in the next election. I would first like to see how KDS behaves in Riksdag and how the Center Party reacts," he said.

VPK Charges SDP, Nonsocialists Collaborating

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Oct 85 p 8

[Text] It is certainly too early to dismiss all the Social Democratic campaign promises. But if they seek support from the right for their policies it will constitute a betrayal of the voters.

That was the opinion of VPK [Left-Communist Party] which held a party committee meeting over the weekend for the purpose of evaluating the election results, among other things.

Some anxiety can be detected in the party that the government might seek support from the nonsocialist parties instead of from VPK.

More Active Role

"The government declaration gave no hint of where it intends to seek support. At best it seems to indicate that the government intends to rule with the help of shifting majorities," said VPK leader Lars Werner.

The election outcome apparently gives VPK a more active role in Riksdag. The party's active support is needed to get the Social Democratic proposals enacted. Now it is conceivable that the SDP government will turn to one or more of the nonsocialist parties in order to gain passage for certain proposals.

This could involve certain savings proposals that VPK is unlikely to support, for example.

Would VPK consider overturning the government in this case?

"We do not discuss things in those terms. But the government knows very well which areas we consider to be most important. It would be suicidal to provoke us on these points," Lars Werner said.

Werner was referring primarily to distribution policy, environmental issues, the 6-hour day and employment policy.

"We are totally opposed to the government's intervention in the contract process last year and the talk about restraint," said Werner. "This will lead to an even more unfair distribution policy."

Cuckoo in the Nest

Is VPK willing to economize in any area?

"Cut out the JAS [fighter-bomber-reconnaissance plane] altogether. It is a cuckoo in the nest that will starve out projects in other branches of the armed forces," the VPK leader said.

VPK intends to continue its old line and pursue an independent policy, Werner said.

The party committee also looked at the election results--which involved 10,000 fewer votes for VPK and the loss of a seat in Riksdag.

Liberal Party Advance Analyzed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "New Role for the Liberal Party"]

[Text] The Liberal Party has suddenly moved to center stage in Swedish politics. It has grown from a small party into one that has to be taken into account and listened to. The transformation occurred at breakneck speed for the other parties as well as for the Liberals themselves. It is no wonder that the Conservatives and the Social Democrats have tried to come up with a number of explanations for the Liberal Party's enormous election gains.

The Liberal Party has now issued a little report, "The Way Back," that effectively combats these myths. The fact that the Liberal Party was able to win votes because it was protected from Social Democratic attacks, which is something the Conservatives have complained about, had something to do with the way the election was set up: the election was supposed to be a showdown between the "two big parties," a decision they both made. The Liberal Party itself, like the Center Party, stressed being part of "the forgotten Sweden"; no one heard what was being said from the middle of the spectrum.

The Conservatives have also charged that the Liberals avoided an open discussion of unpleasant savings cuts and instead criticized their brothers on the right. In the report the Liberal Party convincingly proves that both savings cuts and criticism of the right occurred often and at an early date in Bengt Westerberg's presentation. The Conservatives were the ones who stabbed themselves in the back by failing to carry out the debate on the "change in the system."

The Social Democrats have their own interpretation of the conduct of the Liberal Party in the campaign. They say that social liberalism was not apparent until a few weeks before the election when the Social Democrats came down hard on neoliberalism. That explanation does not hold water either. There were social liberal elements at a much earlier date when Bengt Westerberg was rebuilding the party.

But it is accurate to say that the Liberal advance would hardly have been possible without the strong Social Democratic criticism of the Conservative solutions. When the negative aspects of the Conservative Party's freedom program were revealed, the Liberal Party's more restrained program of change was a natural alternative.

The Liberal Party's own explanation for its election gains is based on the objectivity and consistency of its message, ideological clarity and the close ties binding the entire party together. This undoubtedly provides a major part of the reasons for the party's progress. Bengt Westerberg has been very deliberate in his effort to build up the Liberal Party's identity. First the party must be a reliably nonsocialist one--that is why he stressed the goal of a three-party coalition government, tight economic policy and hard fundamental criticism of Social Democracy.

On this basis he was able to shape a socially liberal profile step by step via a number of concrete proposals, especially the proposal that old people have a room of their own. This happened at least a year and a half before the election.

Social liberalism is undoubtedly based on a solid footing throughout the entire party--but it has long been a feature of the nonsocialist bloc. Objectivity and consistently certainly played a major role for the voters, but for many the decisive factor was the neobourgeois charm of the Liberal Party. For the most part the ideological attack has been aimed at the Social Democrats.

It is on the basis of this position that the Liberal Party will act in Riksdag politics which are now getting under way. It is important for the party to hold onto the newly-acquired voters who are only loosely affiliated with the party. This will require both nonsocialist credibility and a matter-of-fact political style.

The Social Democrats, who are squeezed in between the need for supporting votes from VPK and the urgent need for economic austerity measures of a nonsocialist type, have had friendly words for the Liberal Party after the

election. The spirit of conciliation is spreading through Riksdag. But this kind of behavior contains a tactical element.

The Liberals have unpleasant memories of the results of opening up to the Social Democrats. And they have now seen the positive benefits in the campaign of taking a tough stand. That is why the Liberal Party is rejecting any agreements unless all the nonsocialist parties go along with them.

It is here that the Liberal Party has an opportunity to use the opposition role for something else besides pure confrontation. This could dominate this parliamentary period since the Liberal Party is now the biggest middle-spectrum party and the middle group in turn has become larger than the Conservative Party.

If the Liberal Party can unite the three nonsocialist parties around a policy that has the necessary toughness without being demonstrative this could form the basis for new contacts between the government and the nonsocialist camp. This would be for the sake of national interests, instead of tactical benefits.

Conservatives Study Setback Causes

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Kaa Eneberg]

[Text] It was a mistake to get buried in details and say that communities had to save on transit services and children's sports activities.

It was a mistake to hold mammoth meetings and it was a mistake just to talk so much about freedom without linking it to the old Conservative message of the responsibility and obligations of individual citizens.

Those were some of the critical remarks DAGENS NYHETER heard among the hundreds of Conservatives who are holding a post-election meeting in Stockholm today for the purpose of discussing the election defeat and how the party should act in Riksdag under these new circumstances. The party, which had counted on big election gains, received the support of only 21.3 percent of the voters compared to 23.6 percent in 1982.

The meeting today in Sahlen House in downtown Stockholm is for the Riksdag group, which has lost 10 people since the last election. But it is also open to the party's 30 association chairmen who will hold a formal meeting on Thursday, 10 October.

According to vice chairman Lars Tobisson, whose election district (Goteborg) declined by more than 5 percent, they will talk more about the future than about the election. Tobisson, who helped plan the election campaign, told us that the discussion of the election "is mostly over with."

Blaming the Social Democrats

Later this fall the results of these meetings and the districts' own post-election conferences will form the basis for the 3-year plan the party committee will prepare.

Tobisson, who belongs to the so-called neoliberal group around Ulf Adelsohn, thinks the main reason for the election losses was that the party struck the wrong note when it was constantly forced to refute the Social Democratic accusations about things like the change in the system, which he says is something the ruling party thought up.

The Conservatives lost the most in so-called blue areas where they took votes away from the Liberals in the last election. The Liberals reclaimed these votes this time. In traditionally red areas like Norrbotten they more or less held their ground.

But not all Conservative Riksdag members are as inclined as Tobisson to blame the election defeat solely on the Social Democrats and the press.

Big Meetings a Mistake

"The Conservative campaign was based too much on simply talking about freedom without linking it to responsibility. In the area of family policy we just talked about money for families without talking about children," said Alf Wennerfors, a veteran of 24 parliaments.

He was also critical of the mammoth Conservative meetings people saw on TV. That kind of meeting is alien to the Swedish temperament, Wennerfors said.

Ingrid Hemmingsson, member of Riksdag from Jamtland, also criticized the enormous meetings. Jamtland is also the only county where the Conservative position remained the same with one seat in Riksdag. But in spite of that the Conservatives in Jamtland are disappointed, because they expected to make big election gains.

"There was not enough of a future perspective or enough ideology in the campaign. These are necessary ingredients when one has to choose a social system" said Hemmingsson, a domestic science teacher from Froson.

Conservative Leader Stiff

Like most Conservative members of Riksdag she drew the line at criticizing Conservative leader Ulf Adelsohn. She did say she wished he had been "more natural" in the campaign. But it was not so much Adelsohn's fault as that of his advisers that he did not behave as the spontaneous person he is, she feels.

"Adelsohn was forced to be much too stiff and composed on the TV screen," she said.

"We should never have gone into detail about how communities should save money. When 40,000 people assembled at Ullevi stadium were told that we want to cut sports activities for young people we were unable to defend ourselves," said Jens Eriksson, a fisherman and Conservative member of Riksdag from Bohus County, an old Liberal stronghold where the Conservative support dropped 4.5 percent this time.

"We should leave it entirely up to the communities to set their priorities and decide where to save money," said Eriksson, who also had a hard time defending the attack on transit services in his home town of Tanum where 3500 of the 11,000 inhabitants are retirees.

Bohman Popular

Eriksson did not criticize Ulf Adelsohn but he did say that former Conservative Party leader "Gosta Bohman was always very popular on the west coast." He noted that the fact that the party leader spent a good deal of the campaign at his summer home in Karingon in the county did little to boost voting figures there.

The grudge Conservative Party leaders hold against Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg was not shared by the Riksdag members and party delegates DAGENS NYHETER talked to. Instead they all expressed great admiration for Bengt Westerberg as a person and for his straightforward behavior.

6578

CSO: 3650/22

MILITARY

DENMARK

COALITION PARTIES ASSAILED FOR 'PASSIVITY' IN SECURITY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Oct 85 p 12

[Commentary by 'Monitor': "Nonsocialist Insecurity"]

[Text] Where are the nonsocialist politicians in the security policy debate? 'Monitor' fears that the passivity on the part of the coalition parties in the long run will prove to be more detrimental to the Danish security policy than the activity of the Left wing.

The most recent 5-6 years have seen an intensive security policy debate in Denmark. Certainly the most intensive and far-reaching debate since Denmark became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949.

One of the most distinct features of this debate has been the silence on the part of the nonsocialist politicians. Apart from the foreign minister and the defense minister, what has happened to the politicians of the coalition parties?

Well, there have, of course, been certain indignant letters in the papers, stating how terrible it is that the Social Democratic Party has failed the broad cooperation and allowed itself to be influenced by the Socialist People's Party and the peace movements. The same theme has, indeed, been briefly touched upon in the meetings of the local constituency organizations where the believers have been content with formulations resembling slogans, such as "Never again a 9 April," that the Left wing ought to go to Moscow to find out whether it would be allowed to protest there, etc.

But, apart from that, the politicians of the coalition parties have rather consistently failed to participate in the debate. It is the Left wing which decides the themes, and it is the Left wing which puts forward detailed arguments.

In the Folketing, the coalition parties leave the argumentation to the responsible minister, and the spokesmen have reduced themselves to ideological backstops when it comes to exchanging brief remarks without any real relevance to the topic under consideration.

Within the committees--where the actual work of the Folketing takes place in other areas--the ordinary Folketing members of the coalition parties have the lowest turnout. This applies to the foreign affairs committee, the defense committee, the special security policy committee (the Østergaard Committee) and probably also to the Foreign Policy Committee and the Eleven-Member Committee on the defense arrangement. It is also the representatives of the coalition parties which in the work of the committees advance the fewest questions, viewpoints and arguments.

Exactly the same picture is found within the public bodies outside the Folke-ting which include representatives of the political parties, such as the Security and Disarmament Policy Committee and the Army Welfare Service Committee.

The situation is, furthermore, the same when it comes to the numerous meetings, conferences, hearings, etc., of recent years on security policy issues which are taking place throughout the country. In the meetings and conferences, where emphasis is placed on a presentation of the viewpoints of the political parties, the organizers often find it difficult to find any representatives at all of the coalition parties--let alone qualified representatives.

And in the conferences where, through presence, questions and debate, it is possible to become acquainted with conditions and viewpoints which are not prevalent in the Danish party policy debate--where, in other words, it is possible to learn something--the nonsocialist politicians are usually conspicuous by their absence. The arrangements in conjunction with the recently concluded Niels Bohr symposium are but one of numerous examples.

In view of the fact that things are in such a bad way in this country, it is, of course, not surprising that when it comes to important security policy conferences and meetings abroad, the situation is even worse. This applies both to more or less official arrangements under NATO auspices and in connection with nonofficial international conferences.

It is long since the organizers of such arrangements had any hopes at all of participation--let alone active participation--on the part of the Danish coalition parties. And this in spite of the fact that the Danish security policy in these very years, for well-known reasons, attracts special attention and creates the need for qualified information. The fact that Denmark is a small country provides no sufficient explanation of the lack of participation on the part of the politicians in the international debate. This will be seen from a comparison with countries such as Norway and the Netherlands, where the situation is entirely different.

With his usual talent for dramatic formulations, the foreign minister has stated and written that these years see a struggle for the brains and hearts of the people. However, if one has got neither the will nor the ability, through knowledge and arguments, to exert an influence in the Danish security policy debate, one, naturally, will not get it. That ought not to be surprising to persons who have made politics their profession.

The defense of the hitherto basis of the Danish security policy and the supporting arguments in the debate on current problems is represented in the public debate first and foremost by army officers. Out of a feeling of duty rather than desire, they are thus often forced to assume a political role which neither they themselves nor any others, in the long view, may profit by.

The failure on the part of the nonsocialist politicians to make a contribution in an area which they themselves, on solemn occasions, describe as decisive, may thus, through a political exposure of the officer corps, prove far more damaging to the Danish defense in the long run than the attacks which might come from the political Left wing.

7262

CSO: 3613/9

MILITARY

DENMARK

BRIEFS

DANES BEST NATO SOLDIERS--For the third time in a row, the Danish Armed Forces have won the north region infantry competition of NATO. From 8 to 10 October, two specially selected infantry groups from the Danish Armed Forces on Bornholm received the first place in a competition that took place at Heistadmoen in Norway, 85 kilometers south-west of Oslo. In addition to the Danish, Norwegian and West German soldiers, units from the allied nations which will come to our rescue in an emergency or war situation, participated in the competition, i.e. Canada, the Netherlands, with marine infantry, and Great Britain, with teams from the British Armed Forces and The Royal Marines. The competition comprised five phases, consisting of intelligence and reconnaissance patrols in the dark, infantry skills, such as shooting in the dark, mission march and group shooting. One of the two Danish infantry groups won the first place in the total result, well ahead of its closest competitors. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Oct 85 p 13] 7262

CS0: 3613/9

MILITARY

NORWAY

NAVY TO PROCURE NEW MINECLEARING VESSELS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Navy to Build Mineclearing Vessels"]

[Text] The navy is to build new mineclearing vessels. The invitation to submit bids will go out during 1986. For the present they are working on requirements for specifications for the new vessels. "The first of the new minesweepers can be delivered around the turn of the year in 1988-89," Navy Inspector General, Rear Admiral Bjarne Grimstvedt tells AFTENPOSTEN. Grimstvedt does not disregard the fact that the vessels can be built under license in Norway. Today the navy has 10 vessels which must be replaced.

The navy inspector general recently concluded a tour in the USA to have a look at various efforts, among other things, in connection with the new American plans regarding a minesweeping conception. Grimstvedt emphasizes that other European countries are also in the process of building new minesweepers. This includes both the Netherlands, Belgium and France. To be sure, the tactics as far as Norway is concerned are totally different from those of the other countries:

"Our task will be to clear the skerries so that we can keep communication lines at sea open between the sections of the country," he says.

To the question of whether the new minesweepers will also be built out of wood, as is the case with the 10 old ones, Grimstvedt answers that several possibilities are open: "Glass-fiber-reinforced plastic, possibly built by the so-called 'sandwich' technique, that is, with honeycomb-like plastic placed between two layers, is among the possibilities. But steel or wood can also come under consideration," the inspector general says. He adds that the main thing for minesweepers is that they have as low a magnetic and acoustic characteristic as possible so that the mines do not detonate when they are being searched for.

The inspector general emphasizes that Norway places great demands on seaworthiness and durability. As far as the size is concerned, Grimstvedt figures that it will be about like for the old "Sauda" class. The length of these 30-year-old boats is 144 feet.

Among the 10 minesweepers Norway has, the KNM [Royal Norwegian Navy] "Tana" was converted to a mine-hunting vessel in 1977. The conversion of the vessel was a test project which was to form the basis for the replacement of the "Sauda" class during the 1980's. In Storting Report No 74, regarding the main guidelines for the armed forces' activities during the period of 1984-88, it reads that because of age and equipment the "Sauda" class is of limited value in the face of a modern mine threat and that they should be replaced during the plan period. However, it reads further that the navy's budget does not make this possible and that for this reason it is necessary to update a number of old minesweepers at the same time as work will be begun on a prototype for a mine-hunting vessel.

"Uncertainty with regard to the nautical engineering possibilities of updating the 'Sauda' class of minesweepers can involve the need for speeding up the mine-hunting vessel project," it reads.

Among the navy's leadership it is hoped that the amount of money that is now available will stretch to purchase 10 of them. How large this sum is they do not want to come out with at the present time, for business reasons:

"We must wait for bids first so that they can be as realistic as possible," it is emphasized to AFTENPOSTEN.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

FLOTEX EXERCISE SAID TO SHOW NEED FOR MORE ESCORT CRAFT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Clear Need for Three More Escort Vessels"]

[Text] This year's FLOTEX exercise is revealing a distinct need for more escort vessels than the seven we have. Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen tells AFTENPOSTEN that the exercise has shown that three well equipped vessels of this type are necessary for the supply lane between South Norway and North Norway to be able to be kept free of foreign submarines and planes in case of war. Admiral Pedersen emphasizes that the experience of the FLOTEX exercise has shown that our minesweepers are in no way capable of meeting the mine threat.

For the escorting duties for the between 75 and 100 supply vessels in transit at any one time in the case of war, this year the FLOTEX exercise leadership has utilized coastal vessels and requisitioned fishing vessels:

"This is a poor man's solution. But in cooperation with professional escort vessels these vessels constitute a valuable supplement. They have little combat value alone. But by means of their own equipment too they can put not inconsiderable pressure on attacking submarines."

"However, it is only professional escort vessels which can bring battle-deciding weapons into action and lead the other vessels in combat. This year's FLOTEX exercise has demonstrated this," Rear Admiral Pedersen says, and emphasizes that the three frigates which took part in the exercise demonstrated that new sonar equipment and combat guidance equipment are a necessary investment.

"I figure that this will be in place within a five-year period and that the navy will again have five operational frigates and two corvettes," Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen says. He is the commander of naval forces in South Norway.

He led the exercise together with the commander of naval forces in North Norway, Rear Admiral Torolf Rein. The last phase of the exercise consisted of an invasion exercise in Vestfjorden [West Fjord]. The attacking forces consisted of frigates, corvettes and coast guard ships supported by motor

torpedo boats, helicopters and planes. The defenders had a complete coastal defense with coastal artillery forts, land stations, and minelayers in cooperation with submarines, motor torpedo boats and airplanes. The intense battles were marked by signal rockets and flashing lights.

Rear Admiral Pedersen emphasizes that although the minesweepers did not do the job, it was a challenge to the leadership to provide the best possible defense.

"We had good assistance from mine divers, of which now there are a couple of troops. Our goal is to train still more. To be sure, they have a limited operation radius, but are outstanding as far as the clearing of harbors, for example, is concerned," he says.

To the question of whether it is likely that the navy will manage to keep attacking submarines at a distance in war time when we do not even manage to keep Norwegian fjords free of Soviet submarines in peace time, Pedersen answers that this year's FLOTEX exercise also has demonstrated that the navy derives great benefit from the public's vigilance as far as the recording of minelaying and of unidentified objects at sea is concerned.

"Besides, the navy is banking on using conditions in inner channels to its own advantage. The tactics we have gradually developed make this possible," Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen emphasizes to AFTENPOSTEN.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

OKEAN 85, OCEAN SAFARI NAVAL EXERCISES COMPARED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Sep 85 p 4

[Commentary by Olav Trygge Storvik: "'Ocean Safari' NATO's Biggest Naval Exercise; Clenched Fist Toward Soviet Union's Deployment in Norwegian Sea"]

[Text] The big NATO "Ocean Safari" exercise was concluded yesterday off Bodø. It is the largest naval exercise which has been carried out up to now within NATO, and in many respects is a response to the Soviet "Okean" major exercise this summer. It is also the first time an American aircraft carrier has sailed so far north in Norwegian waters. And it was the aircraft carrier with the symbolic name "USS America" which was chosen to practice rescue plans for Norway. In this there is a security policy message which is certainly understood in Moscow.

The plan of the NATO "Ocean Safari" exercise was not tailored after the huge Soviet "Okean 85" naval exercise this summer. It was the fleet's commander, American Admiral Henry C. Mustin, who reported this to AFTENPOSTEN aboard the aircraft carrier "America" while the exercise went into its most critical phase--the very gaining of mastery of the sea--in the Norwegian Sea this week.

At this point in time the three American battle groups with the aircraft carriers "Saratoga," "Eisenhower" and "America," spread over the huge ocean area between Iceland and Scotland, were ready to sail into the Norwegian Sea. In addition there was a battle group constructed around the battleship "Iowa," which by means of cruise missiles and long-range 16-mm guns gave the entire fleet an extra far-reaching clenched fist, an offensive striking power to overcome enemy forces on the ocean surface.

Admiral Mustin is correct insofar as the fact that the very planning of this major exercise must have been completed long before the Russians this summer carried out a surprising deployment in the Norwegian Sea with a great number of warships both from the Black Sea and Baltic fleets as well as the North Fleet on the Kola Peninsula. Large Soviet naval air forces also took part in addition. But the beginning phases of the planning of the NATO "Ocean Safari 85" exercise must have taken place already three years ago. (It takes this long to prepare an exercise of such an international scope.)

Copies

Nevertheless, there is a clear connection between the two exercises. It can almost be said that they are copies of one another, and this is true not only philologically: "Okean" and "Ocean." Since the middle of the 1960's in Western quarters a strong Soviet naval buildup has been witnessed, a buildup which to begin with was concentrated in the Baltic and Kola Peninsula region. After these regions had almost been "satiated" as naval bases with vessels, buildings and support arms (there are 16 major airfields on the Kola Peninsula alone), the Soviet Union's naval buildup in recent years moved to the Pacific Ocean, with the center of gravity in the Vladivostok-Sakhalin region, with an advance base in Vietnam (Cam Ranh).

The buildup took place in a surprisingly short time--only 20 years--and is the stranger in light of the fact that the Soviet Union is a land power, an enormous continent with all the resources it needs within its own borders. This is not the case with the NATO countries, which in contrast with the Soviet Union are heavily dependent on open communication lines over the oceans. The Soviet naval buildup has also not had a defensive objective, like, for example, to protect the strategic missile-carrying nuclear submarines which operate under the ice in the Arctic and which look after the nuclear balance relative to the USA.


On the contrary, there are distinctly offensive features to the Soviet buildup, with an aim toward developing a fleet which by means of a balanced choice of weapons systems will be able to exercise control over large ocean areas and, besides, have the ability to break communication lines over the high seas. We have still not seen the end of this development. Pictures taken by satellite have shown that Moscow is in the process of building large aircraft carriers like the American, and prominent admirals in the West have also shown that the Soviet Union is in the process of developing long-range naval fighter planes. All together, this means that the Soviet Union in a few years can operate even farther than now out on the high seas.

It was precisely such a plan which the Soviet "Okean 85" summer exercise demonstrated. For the first time the Russians documented an exercise pattern with a consistently offensive character and which contained all the elements for establishing sea mastery in the Norwegian Sea. The exercise also included simulated attacks against especially strategic places on the Norwegian coast with the objective of conquering them as support stations for advance air operations in war time. In this respect Norway will be behind advance Soviet naval operations in the Norwegian Sea. At the same time the exercise pattern suggests that a great deal will be brought into action in order to overcome important airfields in Norway so that Soviet planes can support the fleet's operations even farther at sea.

Central Norway

Half of the Soviet ships which took part in this summer's exercises sailed from ports on the Kola Peninsula, and the largest vessels of all took part, including the aircraft carrier "Kiev" and the battle cruiser "Kirov." A

selection of destroyers, frigates, landing vessels, and, not least, submarines in great numbers also took part. The ships from the Kola Peninsula were organized into three attack groups which from an area near Jan Mayen set course toward Central Norway. And it is precisely in Trøndelag that the stockpiles for the American marine infantry brigade are located. An allied rescue party must also come here in case of war, if it is not cut off or is forestalled, as the Soviet Union has now demonstrated can be an objective.



This map section is often called the Soviet Union's maritime quadrant. Seen from Moscow, the Scandinavian countries appear as a barrier which hinders free operations for Soviet naval forces, and which would be an advantage to control either politically or militarily. The Soviet "Okean 85" exercise this summer aimed at sea mastery in the Norwegian Sea and at locking NATO's naval forces out. As indicated on the map, submarine barriers were established in four areas: North Cape - Svalbard, Lofoten-Greenland, Scotland-Iceland, and Scotland - South Norway. Vessels from the Baltic Fleet sailed out and grouped in the southern section of the North Sea in order to practice attacks to the north. Vessels from the North Fleet on the Kola Peninsula organized themselves into several combat groups near Jan Mayen and practiced, among other things, attacks against Central Norway.

This possibility was tested in the Soviet exercise. Thirty vessels from the Soviet Baltic and Black Sea fleets had evidently been assigned the role of

the NATO fleet. They grouped first in the southern section of the North Sea and simulated delivery of a rescue force with British and Dutch commando units en route to Norway. This group was stopped by Soviet combat forces from the North Fleet at about the latitude of Bergen, where the "NATO fleet" was torn open and defeated. A combat group built up around the aircraft carrier "Kiev" then rushed westward in order to meet another Soviet group of vessels which evidently simulated American aircraft carriers, for they attempted to enter the Norwegian Sea north of Scotland in order to support allied forces en route to Norway.

Simultaneously with these operations on the ocean surface, long-range Soviet bombers of the Tu-16 "Badger" type and Tu-95D/Tu-95F "Bear" type flew attack missions from bases on the Kola Peninsula against the simulated NATO fleet which attempted to enter the Norwegian Sea between Iceland and Scotland. During the height of the "battles," in the course of three days, around 20 July, no less than 300 missions of Soviet planes against the NATO fleet were recorded. There were exercises in firing from long distances cruise missiles which can be both conventional and can carry nuclear warheads.

A large number of submarines operated all the time beneath the sea's surface. In NATO quarters it is believed that the Soviet submarine forces grouped in four areas in an attempt to establish barriers against allied forces in the Norwegian Sea. The first barrier ran from the North Cape to Svalbard, another one from Lofoten to Greenland, and a third was located in the area between Scotland and Iceland. Besides, a fourth submarine barrier was also set up between Scotland and South Norway. The exercise was concluded with the Soviet amphibious forces carrying out a landing operation on the Kola Peninsula. In Norway's view it precisely this feature of the exercise which stresses its offensive nature. There is little doubt that the Soviet amphibious forces which were trained here have the duty of taking important places on the Norwegian coast in a real situation.

The NATO Exercise

The NATO "Ocean Safari" exercise has precisely the objective of counteracting this scenario which is described here in rough outline. In actuality, "Ocean Safari" is the combined designation for a long series of exercises which are taking place over the entire NATO area and which stretch from the American east coast to Portugal, the Channel area, Iceland and in the Norwegian Sea to Norway. The main objective is first and foremost to practice the maintenance and protection of communication lines over the Atlantic. In this part of the exercise it is especially the delivery of convoys which is being practiced. During the exercise, chartered merchant ships sailed in four convoys from Boston to Iceland, Lisbon and Torbay, from Iceland to Portland, and from Scapa Flow to Baie de la Seine.

The Norwegian Sea is regarded as being of the greatest importance for the purpose of ensuring vital communication lines over the Atlantic. And, besides, Norwegian territory is quite essential as flank protection. It is for this reason important that the Soviet Union does not get to establish sea mastery in the Norwegian Sea leisurely, but that NATO's naval forces

utilize a plan which makes it so that they themselves can choose the time and place for a possible confrontation.

There are particulars to such a plan which the NATO fleet is testing during "Ocean Safari 85." American admirals have long claimed that at least three aircraft carrier groups are required in order to enter the Norwegian Sea. Such a force is included this time. But in addition there is a battleship force built up around the "Iowa" which gives the fleet an extra offensive capacity against enemy surface forces. The British are taking care of fighting submarines, with the helicopter carrier the "Illustrious".

It is uncertain whether it is deliberate or not, but there is a symbolic political message in the fact that the aircraft carrier "America" was selected to sail as far north as to Vestfjorden [West Fjord] in order to practice rescue plans for Norway. This is the first time this has happened and during this portion of the exercise there was practice especially in defending against air attacks, while the Norwegian navy got an opportunity to exercise itself against naval forces which threatened the coast.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

SUPREME COMMAND ISSUES ANALYSIS ON RECENT USSR NAVAL EXERCISE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Sep 85 p 18

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Armed Forces Leadership's Analysis: Soviet Union Exercised in Controlling Norwegian Sea"]

[Text] The Soviet Union exercised in securing rapid control over the Norwegian Sea during the big naval exercise this summer. With this a better basis would also be gained for, among other things, offensive operations against NATO's vital supply lines over the Norwegian Sea.

This is one of the conclusions of a military science analysis made by the Armed Forces Supreme Command (FO) of the big Soviet naval exercise which was carried out in July of this year.

In the analysis FO says that the Soviet defense lines seem to have been put farther south in the Norwegian Sea than normally in recent times, with the consequences this can have for Norway's security policy position in the years to come.

That the Soviet Union is now attempting to push its defense lines still farther south can be associated with the fact that the Soviet naval forces have had new and more effective vessels and weapons systems supplied and that Soviet confidence in their own capacity is increasing as a consequence of this, it reads in the analysis.

FO believes that the same trend could be observed during a major naval exercise in the Pacific Ocean in April this year. Then a Soviet aircraft carrier group operated far advanced in the Pacific Ocean with, among other things, sailing around Japan through the straits in the south and north.

The objective of the exercise in the Norwegian Sea this summer was probably to test the Soviet Union's war plans in the opening phase of a conflict with NATO, FO believes. In addition to the fact that the exercise can be perceived as a plan for offensive operations out in the Atlantic Ocean, it can also be looked on as defense of the bases on the Kola Peninsula and the operating areas of the strategic submarines. During all phases of the exercise NATO was played as the aggressive side with ensuing Soviet reactions.

It was the most extensive Soviet exercise in the Norwegian Sea up to now, and it was carried out during the period of 6 to 25 July. Well over 70 vessels took part, including about 40 submarines and 4 landing vessels from the Baltic Fleet. A large number of missions were also flown from Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula and other places.

Five Phases

FO believes the exercise can be divided into five phases: The first phase which took place from 1 to 16 July simulated a tension situation with the departure from harbors of marker forces to play the enemy. Phase 2 came from 16 to 18 July and can be compared with the time just before the outbreak of war. A readiness sally of vessels from ports on the Kola Peninsula then took place. At the same time the marker forces were in place and moved toward the Norwegian Sea. Phase 3 came on 18 July with the outbreak of war and air attacks against the Kola Peninsula. At the same time the North Fleet's heavier surface vessels fought their way out into the Norwegian Sea. The attack against the Kola Peninsula continued during phase 4 and the height of the battles. The marker forces in the Norwegian Sea were defeated and Soviet control was established over the Norwegian Sea.

The vessels' return voyage to their ports can be seen as a fifth phase, and during this portion landing operations were practiced on Poluostrov Rybachi [Fisherman's Peninsula]. Without its being said in FO's analysis which was issued publicly, the exercise with amphibious forces can be regarded as a typical offensive element during the exercise and in the context which was demonstrated here they can only be thought of as being "d against Norway.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

CAUTION URGED IN RESPONDING TO REPORTS OF MATERIEL SHORTAGE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Sep 85 p 2

[Op Ed Article by John Berg: "Our Armed Forces Billions of Kroner Behind"]

[Text] In NORSK MILITAERT TIDSSKRIFT [NORWEGIAN MILITARY JOURNAL] No 3 of this year, Research Director Ragnvald Solstrand of the Armed Forces Research Institute presented an analysis which shows that the armed forces are 10 to 15 billion kroner behind as compared with the Armed Forces Commission's budget of 1978. In six years a shortage has been accumulated equal to the redemption value of all key materiel in the navy. The research director wrote: "In somewhat simplified fashion we can accordingly say that we almost have a situation in which one third of the armed forces is lacking its key materiel."

One would think that the analysis would have exploded like a bomb in the armed forces debate and forced the political parties which have given the Armed Forces Commission their support to come out with clear positions, but this did not happen.

Warnings

In 1977 a serious shortage of experienced fighter pilots began to develop in the air force. Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, who took over in the fall of 1979 when the crisis had become evident, went against the advice of military professionals and did not manage to turn the development around. Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad claimed for over three years that the problem was exaggerated, this in spite of the fact that there was no lack of warnings. On 23 February 1981 Air Force Inspector General, Lieutenant General Ingar T. Narvhus stated: "If the dramatic departure of pilots which has taken place in recent years gets to continue, it is quite simple to come up with when the air force will cease as an independent branch of the armed forces." In August 1983 his successor, Major General Magne T. Sørensen, said: "If it is at all the intention for us to have an air force as a component of an approximately balanced defense system, something must be done to stem the flight of pilots over to civil aviation. And this must be done quickly. From military quarters we have done what can be done, but it is not enough. Now it is the responsibility of the politicians."

Political Responsibility

The consequences of the pilot crisis for our defense capacity are very serious. The measures the political leadership finally began came too late and, besides, we must fear that they are a failure. They remind one of a rescue attempt with a faultily constructed safety net a week after the person who fell from the 10th floor had gone by.

The pilot crisis has also not become a hot political topic. It can be asked whether an equivalently important issue in any area outside the armed forces could have gotten to have gone so unnoticed.

Budget Growth

In April the Defense Ministry presented an English-language, very flattering survey of real budget growth from 1978, i.e., for approximately the same period in which FFI's [Armed Forces Research Institute's] data show a deficit of 10 to 15 billion kroner. The ministry placed emphasis on explaining certain budget technical deviations in Norway's and NATO's calculation methods. For this reason grounds for reflection are provided by the fact that the ministry did not explain what we can conclude from Solstrand's study, namely that the figures are strongly misleading. Among other things, they do not take into account the fact that the coast guard, the working environment legislation and UN forces have had their budgets squeezed. Whether Norway now and then has reaped a little too much praise in NATO by presenting figures which are a little too good-looking is a delicate question. As a contributor to international professional military media, however, this article writer has markedly increasing interest in how it really stands with Norway's defense capacity.

This Year's Election Campaign

When the security policy eventually became a topic in the election campaign, they did not manage to point the guns at the heart of the matter: The Labor Party's NATO-loyal wing lost the internal party debate because they did not manage to demonstrate that the left wing's reasoning was unsound. The Conservative Party was also not able to do this and thereby the party did not manage to influence the debate or the landslide in the in-between parties. In 1980-81, for example, it was easy to stop the idea of nuclear-weapons-free zones, because it is easy to demonstrate that such zones would cause NATO big problems without influencing the machinery which controls nuclear weapons in the East. The Labor Party was conned in the zone issue because they did not understand the Soviet Union's military organization structure and operational pattern. It is alarming that the Conservative Party never managed to focus this classroom example on how it can go with security policymakers who underestimate the importance of studying sheerly military conditions.

In the Conservative Party they certainly think that four meritorious years have been invested for the armed forces. The party should now subject this opinion to a thorough examination and place the cards on the table as far as the armed forces' real needs are concerned, as Solstrand has done. For the next four years the government must muster the necessary capacity to solve

the pilot crisis and the armed forces' other practical problems and the will to chisel out valid arguments in security policy matters in which the professional military situation is central.

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CSO: 3639/169

MILITARY

NORWAY

MASS QUITTING OF AIR FORCE LONG DISTANCE WARNING PERSONNEL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Sep 85 p 32

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Officer Crisis in Air Force: Flight from Warning Cordon"]

[Text] The air force's monitoring and warning cordon is in an acute crisis as personnel in groups are reporting themselves available in the labor market. Personnel at the Måkerøy long-distance warning station have already come out with an advertisement in the daily press. Technical officers at the air station in Sørreisa are also dissatisfied. Captain Gudmund Larsen tells AFTENPOSTEN that if his colleagues at Måkerøy get a "nibble" in the civilian sector, 14 of his colleagues at the Sørreisa station will come out with an equivalent advertisement.

"Officers not from military academies, the so-called Group II officers, are now split into a promotion group for administrative and operational officers and one for technical officers. Technical officers have received a worse promotion ladder than they had before the introduction of the new officer system. This is at variance with the Storting's assumptions when the officer system was discussed," Gudmund Larsen says to AFTENPOSTEN.

He refers to the fact that technical officers have a longer technical education behind them before they begin as officers and that because of the rapid technical progress within the fields of electronics and computer technology it is necessary to return to school and renew one's education every fifth year in order to keep up.

The air force staff monitoring and warning system inspector at the Armed Forces Supreme Command, Colonel Johan Bakken, tells AFTENPOSTEN that he is very concerned about the fact that experienced personnel are seeking transfers from this important service. He wants to summon the personnel and their organizations to a 2-day meeting in the beginning of October in order to have clarified what factors are contributing to the flight of technical personnel from the air force. Bakken does not hesitate to use "acute crisis" regarding the situation which has arisen within the monitoring and warning sector.

Ola Finstad of the Air Force Officers Association and Jan Bråten of the Norwegian Officers Federation both tell AFTENPOSTEN that companies like Geco,

the Kongsberg Weapons Plant, Norsk Data and Amoco gladly hire this well qualified personnel which has had thorough training in the most advanced computer equipment which can be supplied within NATO. Both emphasize that these companies are also approaching already employed personnel and asking for advice and tips for hiring new specialists. This is producing chain reactions. People discover that they receive considerably higher salaries as well as the title of engineer, these two say.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

BRIEFS

HIGHER DEFENSE BUDGET PROPOSED--The proposed appropriation for the Defense Department for next year is 15,901 million kroner, compared with 14.3 billion kroner which was approved for the current year. So for 1986 this represents real growth of 3.5 percent. Among the main items is 352.9 million to the coast guard and 85 million kroner to the UN forces. Fully 6.4 billion is going to material procurement. Of this 164.6 is earmarked for the coast guard. For operations, maintenance and replacement of material 3.1 billion kroner is proposed. The increase in this item of operations expenses of 268 million kroner over this year, however, represents price compensation of about 144.5 million kroner, so the real increase is only 123.5 million kroner. It is assumed that the coast guard will only use 7.2 million kroner for major new procurement. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Oct 85 p 3] 9287

CSO: 3639/19

8 November 1985

MILITARY

SWEDEN

TEN EXPERTS DEBATE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Aug/Sep 85 pp 28-29

[Text] During the fall of 1984 a security policy seminar was held at Gallofsta Course Center, arranged by the 1984 Defense Committee. Ten Swedish security policy experts participated as lecturers in various subject areas within this framework. The speeches attracted considerable attention and have since appeared in book form: "Tio debattinlägg om svensk säkerhetspolitik" [Ten contributions to Swedish security policy], (People and Defense).

It has been discussed in several contributions in the daily press. In his introduction the political editor of SVENSKA DAGBLADET, Mats Svegfors, described the publication as "one of the year's most important books." One of the collaborators on the book is Docent Ingemar Dorfer at the FOA [Defense Research Institute], viewed by Svegfors as "doubtless one of the few security policy experts in this country with an international reputation." Svegfors is of the opinion that the most interesting of Dorfer's contributions is his conclusions, and he comments on these with the following words, among others: "The foremost threat against Sweden does not come from war in the traditional sense. Instead, the threat is found in the peace condition which over the scale of becoming accustomed--adaptation--blackmail--threat--coup--surprise attack is transformed into war. This situation 'so far from the Home Guard romanticism of World War II' requires the correct defense structure and correct diplomacy." Svegfors discusses yet another few chapters of the book. He states that the military-strategic conditions between the superpowers have changed in Northern Europe. We can do nothing about this other than "keep to a strong and intelligently shaped defense, and in so doing it is not primarily the war situation but the crisis situation which is interesting."

In a contribution about the book in DAGENS NYHETER under the headline "Do We Have the Wrong Defense?" department director Mats Ekeblom of the Board of Economic Defense writes, among other things, that "the preconditions for our traditional policy of neutrality have deteriorated and that our defense is incorrectly designed." The book is found to be "relatively easily accessible and contains a large number of facts. That is to say, it is not a book by experts for experts and also not an overly simplified pamphlet, such as is often published by the peace movement and military information people." One contribution to the book by economics professor Ingemar Stahl is commented on: "The military structure and its establishment is so strong that the system is not in fact controllable. The wartime organization and its capability--which

ought to be of primary importance for the military activity--always ends up in the expendable class. The money just disappears for other things, and political plans which may be ever so ambitious come to nothing when they are to be implemented." Wilhelm Agrell contributed to the book. Concerning him Ekeblom writes that "he is not a disarmer. Rather, he wants to make us look behind the loud security policy rhetoric and restructure the defense efforts."

BLEKINGE LANS TIDNING (et al.) also refers to Wilhelm Agrell, in particular, who believes that "there must be political evaluations behind the Soviet transgressions and there is thus reason to believe that the Swedish neutrality will not be respected from that direction."

The concern of two former ambassadors, Sten Sundfelt and Sven Backlund, over the submarine violations is also noted. The latter wants "despite his stated Social Democratic attitude, to keep the question of membership or ties to some defense alliance open." And Prof Kjell Goldmann is of the opinion that "two principal directions for Swedish security policy must be analyzed. Either an adjustment to Soviet demands or some form of looser assistance pact with NATO. The only alternative to this difficult choice, Goldmann continues, is a sharp increase in defense costs." BLEKINGE LANS TIDNING agrees and notes that "more emphasis on airborne and naval units, and preferably some type of standing unit in the conscription system, are recurrent views. One can only conclude that in this case 10 of Sweden's foremost experts have stirred up the security policy pot. But the fact remains that we need a well-informed and unprejudiced security policy debate."

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SUBMARINE WEAPONS REPORTED

Vastergotland-Type Submarine Described

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Aug/Sep 85 pp 6-8

[Unattributed article: "Our New Submarines"]


[Text] The four submarines of type Vastergotland, which at the end of the 1980's are to replace the remaining Draken submarines, are now in full production by principal supplier Kockums in Malmo and by the subcontractor Karlskrona Shipyard, which builds and equips the fore- and afterbody on behalf of Kockums.

The client is the Defense Materiel Agency (FMV), and according to the contract Kockums will get 600 million kronor at the 1981 price level for construction of the four submarines. To this are added previous project and construction costs including costs for materials in the area of weapons, reconnaissance and communications, as well as diesels, electrical propulsion machinery and accumulator batteries, which are procured by the FMV itself. The standard price is 300 million kronor per completed submarine.

The new submarines will be given the names "Vastergotland", "Halsingland," "Sodermanland" and "Ostergotland." The Navy Chief has decided that they will be given the names of provinces, a choice which for many years was reserved for our "provincial destroyers." But the submarines are now the nation's largest combat units and the name may symbolize the significance of the altered situation around our coastline.

The "Vastergotland" is to begin test runs in early 1987 and the entire series is estimated to be delivered and operational in the coastal fleet before 1990.

The development of a new submarine is a lengthy and involved process. Close to 10 years are required from project start to delivery. Preliminary studies have then been undertaken for several years before the project phase. Even if the Vastergotland-type is in large measure a further development of the Nacken submarines which were delivered at the end of the 1970's, the development is particularly rapid as regards weapons and means of reconnaissance and communications, which affect the ship's construction. The "Vastergotland" was designed in cooperation between the Navy Chief, who sets forth the basic objectives, the Defense Materiel Agency, which is the procurer, Kockums which




Cutaway view of a "Västergötland"-type submarine

is project originator and designer as well as principal supplier and the FOA [Defense Research Institute], which studies the threat against our country in the 1990's and searches for the most cost-effective concept. The result has become a submarine with considerably higher performance characteristics in comparison with the Nacken submarines.

The "Västergötland's" principal data are:

length	48.5 m
diameter	6.5 m
displacement in surface position	1,070 tons
speed, surfaced	11 knots
speed, dived	considerably greater
complement	about 20 men

The pressure hull, divided into two compression-proof sections, is built of quenched and tempered steel. This type of steel which gives better strength values but is more complicated to use in the construction phase, is a novelty for Swedish submarines. Great care is lavished on the choice of materials for the submarine and its equipment, but the environment is special and it is a difficult balancing act between requirements for corrosion resistance, for example, and the costs of choosing more sophisticated materials.





Submarine production in Kockum's hull workshops. (Following photos as well.)

The crew is quartered in 2, 4 and 5-men cabins. Only the captain has his own cabin. In addition there are six extra cabins for trainees or other personnel. Meals are served in two sittings in a mess room with adjoining kitchen.

The principal weapon is, as always, torpedoes of various kinds for attack and self-defense. The "Vastergotland" will also have considerable mine-laying capability.

Through the development in the area of antisubmarine warfare it is obvious that the demands for the ship's capability of operating silently have become increasingly important. Much effort has therefore been expended in making the submarine use the quietest components possible, often noise-tested in advance in the laboratory, as well as mounting them on sound-proofing elements. Fluid noise reducers are used in pipe systems and particularly difficult components are enclosed in sound-absorbing boxes.

The requirements for shock resistance against underwater detonations (depth charges) are also great. For this reason as well it is necessary for the submarine's equipment to be mounted on rubber elements or other springs, and in combat the crew is positioned on shock-absorbing platforms. Extensive shock tests of a full-scale submarine section with pipe systems and equipment, for instance, have preceded construction work on the "Vastergotland".



The "Vastergotland's" propulsion is conventional. Energy is taken from lead batteries (Tudor, weight more than 15 percent of the sub's total weight), which are charged from two diesel engines from Hedemora Verkstader. The entire propulsion machinery with screw engine, generators, electrical panels etc. are delivered by French Jumont-Schneider, the same supplier as for the Nacken-class.

However, at United Stirling and Kockums in Malmo development of an air-independent plant for submarine application is under way in cooperation with the Defense Materiel Agency. The installation is based on the Stirling engine, in which motor fuel is burned with oxygen which must be carried on board the submarine in liquid form. (See separate article!) A test plant is in operation in a submarine section at Kockums. The "Vastergotland" will be prepared for equipment at a later stage with this type of additional machinery, which will provide her with greatly extended endurance in a submerged state.

Some of the sub's equipment is foreign. The reason for this is in some cases that resources and expertise are unavailable in our country, in other cases that foreign procurement will be cheaper, an important circumstance with the narrow appropriation frameworks. Foreign suppliers in addition to the abovementioned Jeumont-Schneider are Krupp-Atlas (sonars), Euro Atlas (generators), Barr & Stroud (periscopes), AEG, Worcester, Tod, Lips etc.

The main portion of the equipment is purchased in Sweden, however. In addition to Tudor and Hedemora mention may be made of SSAB (the steel), Saab Combitech (control equipment etc.), Ericsson, PEAB etc.

As earlier mentioned, Kockums is the principal supplier, but the shipyard in turn has ordered the fore- and aftershops of the submarines from the Karlskrona Shipyard. These sections are shipped fully equipped and pretested from Karlskrona to Malmo to be joined with Kockums's two center sections. Kockums is also responsible for final startup and testing. Test runs will be undertaken with Navy crews and will be extensive, particularly with the first submarine. More than 50 days of test runs will be carried out with the "Vastergotland."

Before test runs are initiated extensive training of the crews is needed. This has already begun partly under the leadership of the Navy and partly at domestic and foreign suppliers, where the personnel are given opportunities in connection with test deliveries to thoroughly learn how to operate the materiel.

On behalf of the Materiel Agency the coordinating authority for the procurement phase, that is to say design, construction, testing, test runs, warranty monitoring, training, etc., is the Submarine Construction Section of the Defense Materiel Agency, which has been located in Malmo since the 1960's.

Submarine Sea Mission Followed

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Aug/Sep 85 pp 8-10

[Article by N. H.: "To Show the Lion's Claw"]

[Text] The justly feared submarines of World War II had only a short distance, measured by today's standards, to their information horizon. If the pressure from enemy antisubmarine ships and ditto aircraft was too great, they therefore tried to surface, in order with binoculars and a simple radio--radar listening equipment--to attempt to get a grasp of the tactical situation around them.

Today's submarines, on the other hand, are able in a submerged position to record and take the bearing of ships at sea at long range by means of their sonar-acoustical equipment, and furthermore determine their course and speed, yes, even determine which ships they are listening to. Today submarines thus do not voluntarily surface. In combination with remote-controlled long-range torpedoes, nowadays deployed in complete concealment without the submarine showing any tell-tale masts above the surface, they have acquired considerably greater striking power, a circumstance which has been noted in our country as well by both military leadership and politicians.

Nevertheless, we are forced to conclude that the number of our effective and versatile submarines have been reduced by half. For reasons of preparedness our 12 submarines are now nearly all equipped and manned even in peacetime. They form a part--among many other tasks--of the specially organized antisubmarine forces which have been created due to the repeated submarine violations. Their good reconnaissance capability, great endurance and capacity for concealed action are also of major significance in this context. Perhaps we may also draw the conclusion from the numerous submarine incidents that the submarine is a weapon system with an extraordinary capacity for absorbing blows.

In order to give our readers a current picture of our submarine branch, UNDER SVENSK FLAGG has asked for and received permission to accompany one of the Sjoormen-class submarines of the coastal fleet, the HMS "Sjolejonet," on a mission at sea.

Our Three Submarine Types

In addition to the five submarines of the Sjoormen class we have three newer ones of the Nacken class and four older Draken-class subs. Another four ships are under construction at Kockums and the Karlskrona Shipyard. The first of the series--the "Vastergotland"--will begin test runs next fall.

The Sjoormen vessels were built at the end of the 1960's. They have since undergone radical modernization both as regards communications and weapons materiel and machinery, and they can therefore be regarded as completely "up to date."

Young Crew

A Sjoormen submarine normally carries a crew of 24. However, the "Sjolejonet" also has 9 submarine trainees on board, which is why her crew numbers 33 men with an average age of only 25 years. All but one of these conscripted trainees intend to seek employment as career officers in the submarine force. The master of the ship, Navy Capt Fredrik Hallstrom, is an experienced submarine officer with 11 years of service "under water" behind him.

Realistic Torpedo Launches Essential

The Swedish fleet has an international reputation for undertaking more "live" torpedo launches than most of the other navies. "Live" insofar as the torpedoes are launched against actual ships at sea in order to hit. However, the depth of the torpedoes is regulated so that they pass under the targets, from which the number of hits (and misses) can be recorded.

Experience from the Falkland war shows how important it is to test the torpedoes often and in a combat-like setting. According to reports, the Argentine Navy in particular--but also the English one--had problems with the reliability of the torpedoes. The fact that these, as was mentioned, have developed into technically complicated underwater missiles naturally emphasizes the need for continuous testing.

Exercise of the Day--Torpedo Launching

The exercise is a so-called fine-tuning exercise, in which the whole chain involving the commander-fire control personnel-sonar operators-fire control and torpedo personnel-are to be coordinated into an efficient team.

Five torpedoes will be launched at sea against a target unit in which minelayers participate. The submarine flotilla commander, Cdr Sten Swedlund, has one of his aides, Capt Sten Swedlund, on board one of the target ships as an observer. This is in order to have correct documentation available during the review which always follows about the tactical behavior of the submarine, the number of hits etc.

Relaxed Atmosphere--but Firm Discipline

What strikes a visitor first when diving at sea is the "low voice" with which the order to dive is given. But in a flash it triggers a number of actions by the second-in-command, the engine-room chief, the radio operator, the sonar operator.... Well, the list could go on and on. But common to all are the rapid "rejoinders" to the order, "ready," "completed."

One thing is certain: Himmelstoss, the tormentor of draftees and loudmouth of the classic war novel "All Quiet on the Western Front" would not have liked it on board the "HMS Sjolejonet." And he is likely not have lasted very long on board either, because the demands for emotional stability and for being a good fellow crew member are unconditional. The mood is calm and confident among

the overall-clad men--without any insignia of rank but everyone with "Submarine Force" in large letters on the back.

'Enemy in Sight'

This classic report from lookouts in masts and on bridges is no longer heard aboard submarines. But from the sonar operators: "Two diesel-propelled ships bearing 040, long range. Probably a turbine-driven ship at the same bearing."

The report from the operators--who really are the key men aboard--immediately triggers questions from the ship's command: "Bearing movement? Speed? Approximate range? Identification?"

Gradually, the data asked for are supplied. Orders are given for the angle of attack, altered depth, greater speed and number of torpedoes. Combat and fire control personnel are working at maximum speed. The angle of attack is corrected. The torpedo officer reports all clear for launch. The torpedoes take off. It is scarcely noticed in the submarine.

The most difficult now remains: To guide the torpedoes toward the most valuable targets and to watch out for changes in their course and speed. And after passing the target to guide those torpedoes which may not have hit to make another pass under the targets.

Then phase number 1 is finished on the part of the submarine. But for the specially built torpedo recovery ships remains to find and salvage the torpedoes (their average price is about a million kronor for the most modern types). Meanwhile, the target ships disappear below the horizon to the south.

Thus, the whole day and evening continues before it is time to return to base. Being at sea for just 24 hours is not normal for our submarines, however. Instead, the usual length of a training pass is one to two weeks. Followed by a period of material maintenance and rest. A rather tough program, in other words. But to the question of whether it would not be better to serve on the surface ships, which generally get to the dock--and shore leave--a little more frequently, the "Sjolejonet's" crew replies to a man: "We wouldn't change for anything!"

New TILLMA Engine Described

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Aug/Sep 85 pp 10-11

[Article excerpted from MARIN-NYTT Mar 85: "TILLMA--New Submarine Engine"]

[Text] Of decisive importance for the combat value of the conventional submarine is its capability of staying submerged for extended periods.

The energy for electrical submerged operation is stored in batteries. These are discharged continually during submerged operation and must subsequently be recharged.

For this purpose diesel generating sets are used, which require access to external air in order to operate. This is brought in through the submarine's snorkel mast.

A snorkeling submarine is very vulnerable to discovery and attack.

The means of reconnaissance are developing rapidly and the pressure on a snorkeling submarine will increase in the future.

It is therefore urgent to undertake every measure to increase the interval between snorkeling periods and to reduce their duration.

In Sweden the Navy and Kockums have long devoted themselves to studies and tests of systems for air-independent energy conversion for submarine operation. Regular projects and prototype studies have been conducted with closed-system diesel engines and fuel cells. Test operation has been undertaken with high-energy type batteries as well as with various thermomechanical systems, among them the Stirling engine.

It is the latter technology that has been identified as the one most rapidly developable into an energy system for submarines and which has also been chosen by the Navy for development into such a system. Of decisive importance in this case was the degree of technical maturity of the more essential components of the system:

The Stirling engine:

--Ready for commercial use after many years of advanced development work in Sweden

The fuel chamber for high-pressure combustion:


--Developed in Sweden within a civilian program for power generation under water

The LOX system (LOX: Liquefied Oxygen)


Developed and commercially accessible technology for storage and handling is available in Sweden, as well as the infrastructure for transportation and storage.

TILLMA

The additional TILLMA machinery which is intended for a modern conventional submarine of the 1,000-ton class consists of two Stirling generator sets of about 70 kW each. This output is quite sufficient to supply power to the submarine in the desired case of operation, that is to say silent economic operation with the required auxiliary power for all reconnaissance. The system is parallel-coupled with the battery system, and it delivers power only when greater power delivery is needed. The combustion chambers of the engines



□ Ett TLLMA-aggregat för inmontering på ubåt. (1)



Exempel på driftprofil med tillsatsmaskineri för lågfart. (2)

Key to previous page:

1. A TILLMA unit for installation on a submarine
2. Example of operational profile with additional machinery for low speed
3. Energy supply
4. Battery
5. Days
6. Battery operation
7. Stirling operation.

are supplied with fuel from the submarine's regular supply, but oxygen for the combustion is delivered by one or more supply tanks containing liquefied oxygen (LOX).

The endurance in submerged position depends chiefly on the volume of the oxygen supply, that is to say the size of the tanks, which in turn determine the size of the additional submarine section. However, an increase in length of a little more than 10 percent gives an increase in submerged endurance for the intended operational case of several hundred percent (see above).

Endurance in Submerged Position

The diagram illustrates one example of an operational profile for a submarine with additional machinery for low speed.

The submarine in the example begins its mission with full supplies, meaning including a full supply of oxygen as well as a fully charged battery. The additional machinery is operating, that is to say the battery is not discharging. During the second day an attack operation is undertaken with 3 hours of battery power, after which one switches back to Stirling operation. After yet another concealed period of reconnaissance, another attack operation is undertaken with battery power, etc. The battery is thus discharged at intervals and after approximately 9 days has been discharged by half; the oxygen has then been used up and the submarine is again an "ordinary," conventional submarine.

This submarine has thus completed a 9-day mission with 4 attack moments without having revealed itself through snorkeling!

This example is of course fictitious, but it gives an indication of the potential of the system and the increase in both combat efficiency and degree of survival which can be anticipated.

11949
CSO: 3650/14

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

SCHLUTER'S WAGE GUIDELINES FOR 1985 ALREADY VIOLATED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Oct 85 p 17

[Article by Roar Ostgardsgjelten: "'Wage Explosion' in Denmark"]

[Text] The limit of two percent on wage increases in Denmark this year already has been breached, just a half-year after the Schluter government received majority support in Parliament for measures which ended the huge Danish labor conflict. The government's goal of halving the increases in wages in the country has been shattered in the course of a year.

There are two decisive factors which have caused the wage limits of two percent to be shattered.

- * There is a lack of workers in several trades and geographic areas.
- * Employers' profits are increasing.

The magazine, BORSENS NYHEDSMAGASIN, writes that hidden wage increases of 5,000-6,000 kroner have become common in several Danish industries. The waiting period for sick pay is disappearing and payments in kind, or "fringe benefits," are blossoming.

"Employers and wage-earners are entering into discrete agreements in order to circumvent the narrow wage limits of two percent. In reality, many employers already have given wage increases of five percent or more," according to the magazine.

The leader of the Danish Cabinet Makers and Carpenters Association, Bent Larsen, is accusing the employers of shirking additional requirements of the Association of Danish Employers (DA).

"The firms have eliminated the organizations and we as an association are very concerned about this because it undermines our entire collective bargaining system," says Larsen.

An example is SAS. Its employees have received--over and above the two percent wage limit--a bonus of three kroner per hour, an expanded childbirth leave program, and accident insurance coverage. This results in an overall wage increase of between eight and nine percent this year.

The official statistics from Denmark's Statistics also show that the wage limit has been violated. From February to July of this year, salaries in industry rose by 3.7 percent, contrasted with 4.7 percent in the same period in 1984. DA's statistics show a salary increase of 2.2 percent from the first to the second quarter this year.

But the official statistics and the employers associations' statistics do not cover hidden additional wages and this affects employees in the public sector whose salaries are tied to statistics from the the private sector.

The chairman of the Joint Council of Office Workers and Civil Servants, Martin Romer, says that DA's statistics no longer are reliable. The chairman of the Academicians Central Organization, Erik Stig Jorgensen, calls the private firms' avoidance of the two percent limit a "black market."

But even though the 800,000 public employees suffer from a lag relative to employees in private firms, it is clear that a breakthrough of the two percent limit also has occurred in the public sector. Salaries in the state and municipal governments have increased by 2.39 percent since 1 April.

Greater salary increases, increased employment, and the decline in the dollar which has resulted in keeping import prices stable, have resulted in higher real wages for Danish wage-earners. This has resulted in increased consumer spending and increased imports. The strong decline in interest rates has contributed to a new wave of investments. But Danish exports are not showing any growth, so that the overall result is an increasing deficit in the balance of trade.

12578

CS0: 3639/15

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

EXPORT SECTOR SEEN LAGGING AS CONSUMER CONSUMPTION GROWS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Oct Sect III p 1

[Article by Henrik Skov]

[Text] The order and turnover figures of industry for August more than indicate that industry is still cautious in the export markets. The domestic market is still more attractive, the August figures of the Danish Department of Statistics show.

The order and turnover situation of industry for August gives an extra impetus to the advocates of an early financial policy intervention. The figures of the Department of Statistics more than indicate that industry is still coasting. The domestic market is apparently still too attractive, and industry, therefore, is reluctant to try its strength in difficult export markets.

During the 3-month period--June to August--the volume of orders (current prices) in the export market increased by only 3 percent compared with the same period in 1984, while the volume of orders aimed at the domestic market, on the other hand, increased dramatically by as much as 34 percent. With a rate of inflation, which, this year, will be a little below 5 percent, it is thus a question of a decided drop in the volume of export orders when adjusted for price increases.

August--alone--increases the skewness between the export markets and the domestic market. Compared to August of last year, the volume of orders on hand for the domestic market has increased by 34 percent, whereas the volume of orders on hand for export remains at 3 percent. The volume of export orders on hand is the buffer of industry against market fluctuations in the foreign markets, and that buffer is at present extremely vulnerable for the industrial sector as a whole.

Uneasiness


The shipyards, which are included in these figures, are a major reason for the uneasiness. If the shipyards are omitted from the figures, the volume of orders on hand for the export markets increased by 21 percent, but that is still somewhat below the increase for the domestic market, where the volume of orders on hand increased by 23 percent. The figures for August generate some degree of optimism only where the tables are turned. Here, the volume export orders on hand, aimed at the export market, increased by 22 percent, while the domestic market shows an increase of 19 percent.

Seasonal factors are, to a large extent, reflected in the situation, as far the shipyards are concerned, and there are several bright prospects if the shipyards are left out of consideration. The influx of orders thus shows that the export markets are leading with an 11 percent increase during the period from June to August, whereas August alone had an 8 percent increase over last year. The influx of orders for the domestic market only increased by 6 and 4 percent, respectively, which, on the somewhat longer view, indicates a stagnation in the volume of orders on hand for the domestic market.

The turnover in the export market also increased more rapidly than in the domestic market during the 3-month period. In terms of current prices, the export turnover increased by 12 percent, while the domestic market turnover increased by 9 percent.

The volume of orders on hand of the individual industrial sectors, however, gives rise to considerable concern. The semimanufacture industry actually suffered a loss in turnover of 4 percent in the export market during the month of August. The volume of orders on hand dropped correspondingly by 1 percent, while the volume of orders on hand for the domestic market increased by as much as 12 percent. The order books of the consumer goods industry are also better where it comes to production for the domestic market. The volume of orders on hand here increased by 16 percent as against only 9 percent for the export market.

The report of the Department of Statistics, moreover, shows clearly that the investment goods industry is still operating at full capacity. Here, the largest increases in turnover are in the export market sector, and the volume of orders on hand is still increasing at a very good rate. August showed a 37 percent increase in the volume of orders received from the export market, while the increased demand in the domestic market resulted in a 26 percent increase in the volume of orders for August.



The turnover of industry, adjusted for seasonal changes, shows a stagnation for August, and the turnover of orders shows that industry still has a domestic market with a very large consumer potential.

Key:

- (1) Total industry, excluding shipyards, etc.
- (2) Seasonally adjusted volume index
- (3) Volume index
- (4) Index

7262

CSO: 3613/9

ECONOMIC

ICELAND

BRIEFS

POLISH TRADE OFFICE SET--The Poles have now decided to reopen an office with a trade representative from their country. The previous office had closed in 1980, when severe economic problems were experienced in the Polish economy. This report emerged from trade talks held between the Icelanders and Poles on 9 and 10 September. In 1980, there occurred a significant interruption in trade between the two countries, which had been quite considerable in previous years. The main reason for this diminishing of trade was the worsening economic situation in Poland. This is probably why the main exports to Poland in recent years have been fish meal and dried fish. On the other hand, the Poles have sold us mainly timber, steel goods, grain, various ores and -- one must not forget to mention -- Prince Polo, the nice chocolate cookies; no other country except Poland buys as many as we. In the meetings of the trade representatives there was a wide and deep discussion on trade between the countries, with especial emphasis on measures to increase sales of Icelandic goods to Poland by extending credits. [Text] [Reykjavik FRJALS VERZLUN in Icelandic No 7, 1985 p 8]

CSO: 3626/6

ECONOMIC

NORWAY

CENTRAL BANK LAUDS UNEMPLOYMENT CUT, WARNS OF INFLATION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Sep 85 p 42

[Article by Thomas Knutzen: "Norges Bank's [Bank of Norway's] Latest State of the Economy Report: Strong Growth in Employment"]

[Text] Nineteen eighty-five will probably produce the decidedly strongest growth in employment, measured in hours worked, as long as measurements have been made in Norway since 1972. The Bank of Norway expects in its latest state of the economy report that the number of hours worked will increase by about two percent if the utilization of manpower in the second half of the year is the same as in the first. The Bank of Norway indicates that Norway this year can count on stronger economic growth than in most other countries in Europe, but cautions against increasing inflation.

The Bank of Norway's state of the economy report was written before the government made its decision to rescind the regulation of interest rates. In the report the Bank of Norway argues in behalf of what the government has now done by advocating tightening of the credit policy at the same time as it advises against regulation.

"Experience indicates that this has little or no effect when it is used over the longer term," the Bank of Norway writes regarding regulation of the credit market. "Financial markets outside of credit institutions, besides, have gradually developed so much that great effects can also not be expected in the short term unless regulation is made far more extensive than earlier," it reads.

Danger of Inflation

Even the Bank of Norway focuses on the danger of new inflation. The central bank fears a wage-wage spiral in which wages in the protected trades will create demands for equivalent wage hikes in other sectors. "Preventing such a wage-wage spiral will place great demands on the economic policy."

Wage and income adjustments in which the State is a direct or indirect party will be especially important, it reads, without the State and municipal adjustments, agriculture negotiations and fishing subsidies being mentioned directly.

The Bank of Norway estimates that wage costs per product unit in Norway will increase by at least one percent more than in our competitor countries from 1984 to 1985 when unchanged rates of exchange are counted on technically.

This weakening comes after hourly wages increased in the first half of this year by nine percent and after the wage slide again shows signs of increasing. The Bank of Norway figures that hourly wages will increase by about eight percent from 1984 to 1985.

Increasing in Second Quarter

The central bank is sticking by its earlier forecast of inflation of about 5.75 percent from 1984 to 1985, but sees an increasing inflation rate in the second quarter of this year as an indication that the inflation rate is in the process of picking up.

"The growth in wages will be totally decisive for inflation in 1986. It is obvious that inflation in line with our trade partners cannot be achieved if the growth in wages continues at the present rate," it reads in the report.

The Bank of Norway finds strong growth in most situations which are controlled by demand. Private consumption shows a rate of growth of about 5.7 percent and industrial investment of about 20 percent, and industrial production is 4 percent above the foregoing 3-month period in the last 3-month period.

8985

CSO: 3639/5

ECONOMIC

NORWAY

POSTELECTION BUDGET PROPOSAL: LOWER TAXES, HIGHER SPENDING

Rise in Health Expenditures

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Oct 85 p 1

[Text] There will be real tax reductions next year also. The state budget for 1986, which was presented to the Storting yesterday morning, brings the message that the government intends to cut Norwegians' taxes by a total of 625 million kroner--under the assumption of 5.5 percent inflation. The family allowance will be divided in two parts (over and under age 7) and will be increased by fully 8 percent. In the fee sector the state budget--it will amount to a total outlay of 237.9 billion kroner--an average increase of 7 percent. Beer, wine and spirits will be more expensive. Gasoline tax will presumably be increased by 17 ore per liter, while leadfree gasoline will be cheaper. The government will also increase the charter fee from 150 to 200 kroner, but promises free passage to all under 15. TV licenses will increase by 40 kroner to 830 kroner. The average fare increase for train, bus, boat and aircraft fares will be 7 percent. Postage and telephone rates will remain unchanged.

One Third to Health

Through social and insurance programs the Social Department is laying claim to over one-third of the coming year's state budget. In all 82.6 billion kroner are earmarked for Leif Arne Heloes area of responsibility. It will be invested in increased treatment capacity in hospitals and greater health care for the elderly. Next year's budget will also prioritize research and education, and the police will be strengthened by new positions and budget growth of fully 8 percent. The fight against unemployment will continue--3 billion is devoted to this purpose in the government's 1986 budget.

Expansive Budget Can Cause Crisis

If the expansive policy gets a majority in the Storting, the Willoch government must resign, maintains AFTENPOSTEN in today's editorial. In their everyday life Norwegians will hardly notice any great changes as a result of the government's proposal for a state budget for 1986, emphasized AFTENPOSTEN,

and added: "Let us simply confirm that we are going in the right direction, that new efforts will be made to create a more secure and better society." The budget is expansive, but AFTENPOSTEN believes that the government has found a reasonable political balance.

Paper on 'Expansive Budget'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Expansive Budget"]

[Text] A number of economic experts will undoubtedly believe that the government is spending too much money in the budget proposal for 1986 which Minister of Finance Rolf Presthus is presenting to the Storting today. And rightly so: From a professional economist's viewpoint the budget is too expansive, which means a risk for further weakening of the nation's competitive ability and thereby new difficulties for large parts of our traditional business life. This calls for a strong desire for moderation in central and local revenue adjustments in the coming year. In the opposite case, the Norwegian economy will confront a dangerous time.

This is strictly the professional economist's view. Nevertheless, in the coming days we will hear criticism directed against the government also from another quarter, from parties, organizations and all kinds of press groups which will loudly claim that too little money is being appropriated. Despite the fact that the government is presenting a strongly expansive budget, we know that there will come demands in the Storting for the expenditure of additional billions. It has become a curious technique on the part of some of our popularly elected representatives that government appropriation proposals must automatically be added to. If that should also become the policy of the majority, it will obviously be impossible to bring the Norwegian economy into balance. And what is more: it will bring about the government's resignation. And the expansive politicians will take over.

When working out a state budget the government at the time must undertake a number of political judgments by which different considerations must be evaluated as part of the total picture. The economic structure must fit the central political goal, which for the Willoch government is to guarantee work for all and to secure and further expand the welfare state. If we manage to solve the problems of prices and costs as the government itself assumes, something there will surely be divided opinions about, the budget will bring us a new stretch along the way toward the goals we are aiming for.

In due time we will return to the budget in more detail, and a little bitterness in the chalice will be difficult to avoid. But considering that this is a budget worked out by a government consisting of three independent parties, it is our spontaneous reaction that they have reached a reasonably good political balance. Seen from a viewpoint of political reality it would have been difficult for the outcome to have been otherwise.

Norwegians will hardly notice any changes in their everyday lives as a result of the government's proposed state budget for 1986. Let us simply confirm that we are moving in the right direction, that new measures will be taken to create a more secure and better society. Health and social, education and research are some of the areas which will be especially well looked after.

Reduction of personal taxes of 625 million kroner is perhaps not so impressive when seen in isolation, but the sum of the annual reductions will be significant--and especially when compared with what the result would have been with the Labor Party's approved proposal for tax increases. Added together over a 4-year period it amounts to billions and billions of kroner. Furthermore tax reductions are only one of several methods in progress to strengthen our competitive ability, reduce the nominal wage growth and thereby protect employment.

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